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Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and
Immunity in Public Health Emergencies
SHARONA HOFFMAN*
Many experts predict the advent of a public health emergency resulting from
a flu pandemic or bioterrorism attack in the foreseeable future. At the same
time, many health care providers express significant concern about liability
arising from emergency response activities, as it is unlikely that they would be
able to provide optimal care in crisis conditions. They also state that this
concern will likely influence their willingness to be involved in response activi-
ties. This Article addresses issues that have received little attention in the legal
literature: liability and immunity in public health emergencies. The Article
provides a first-of-its-kind comprehensive analysis of the different theories of
liability that might be used by plaintiffs and the sources of immunity that are
currently available to public health emergency responders. I will argue that the
existing immunity scheme is a patchwork that leaves many gaps and unan-
swered questions. In particular, it largely excludes paid individual and corpo-
rate health care providers who may bear the greatest burden during a public
health emergency as hundreds or thousands of patients simultaneously seek
medical treatment. The specter of liability may induce these parties to refuse to
participate in emergency response efforts, and the unavailability of immunity
could thus significantly compromise public welfare. Moreover, the risk of liabil-
ity raises questions of justice because, unlike their more risk-averse counter-
parts, those that do treat patients, perhaps at great risk to their own health,
would face potential liability rather than be rewarded for their altruism or
professionalism. Consequently, the Article will craft recommendations for statu-
tory reforms to remedy the piecemeal and deficient liability protection system
that applies to health care providers responding to public health emergencies.
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INTRODUCTION
According to many experts, an influenza pandemic will likely develop in the
foreseeable future, and it could sicken or kill tens of millions of people
worldwide if appropriate interventions are not implemented.1 In addition, in the
wake of 9/11, the anthrax exposures, and Hurricane Katrina, it is painfully
evident that bioterrorist attacks and natural disasters can also cause public
health emergencies of significant proportions. Consequently, federal and state
governmental agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and state public health departments, have undertaken major emergency
planning initiatives.2 These include extensive training and educational programs
1. See Jeffrey K. Taubenberger et al., The Next Influenza Pandemic, 297 JAMA 2025, 2025 (2007)
(stating that “most experts believe another influenza pandemic will occur”); Jeff Nesmith, Group:
Pandemic Could Cost U.S. $683 Billion, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 23, 2007, at C1, C3 (reporting on a
study that “assumed that a bird flu outbreak would kill 2 million Americans and sicken 30 percent of
the population”); Gretchen Reynolds, The Flu Hunters, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 7, 2004, at 37, 39
(noting “the assumption that another pandemic is inevitable” and the fact that the 1918 flu pandemic
killed between 20 and 50 million people internationally and 500,000 in the United States); Homeland
Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan 1 (May 2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi_implementation.pdf (stating that “it is pro-
jected that a modern pandemic could lead to the deaths of 200,000 to 2 million people in the United
States alone”); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Pandemic Influenza Strategic Plan 18
(2005), available at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/part1.pdf (assuming that in case of a
pandemic disease, “the clinical disease attack rate will be 30% in the overall population”).
2. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), amended by Pandemic
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831 (2006) (establishing grants for
state and local governments to undertake activities designed to enhance public health emergency
preparedness); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Law Program, http://
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that often involve major professional organizations and academic centers.3
Public health emergencies raise acute concerns about liability for health care
professionals.4 In a recent survey designed by the American Public Health
Association, almost sixty percent of clinicians indicated that having medical
malpractice insurance coverage would be important (24.3%) or essential (35.4%)
to their decision to travel out of state to provide assistance during an emer-
gency.5 Almost seventy percent of respondents answered that immunity from
civil lawsuits would be an important (35.6%) or essential (33.8%) factor when
considering whether to volunteer in an emergency.6 Indeed, even if a defendant
is ultimately found not to be liable and prevails in court, the financial, emo-
tional, and reputational costs of litigation can be devastating regardless of the
outcome.7
Although a variety of sources of immunity currently exist, they constitute a
patchwork that leaves many gaps and unanswered questions.8 This Article will
explore the contemporary immunity scheme and highlight its deficiencies.9 In
particular, it will focus on an often ignored segment of the responder popula-
tion: paid workers and entities that contribute to response efforts.10 These
include, among others, hospitals, clinics, and their employees, who might be
inundated with hundreds or thousands of patients at the height of a crisis.
Although these parties may bear the brunt of response duties, little if any
immunity is available to them because immunity statutes primarily cover govern-
mental responders and individual volunteers.11 The Article will argue that the
www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/about.asp (describing the emergency preparedness goals of the CDC’s Public
Health Law Program).
3. See, e.g., AMA/CDC Second National Congress on Health System Readiness, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/17239.html (conference that took place in Washington, D.C. in July 2007);
CDC Public Health Law Program, Public Health Emergency Law & Forensic Epidemiology Training,
http://www2.cdc.gov/phlp/phel.asp (offering training concerning a variety of legal topics including
“Protection of People” and “Management of Property”); University of Minnesota Center for Public
Health Preparedness, Free Online Trainings and Resources, http://www.sph.umn.edu/umncphp/
phet.html (offering computer training modules that include the topics of disease surveillance and
investigation, contact investigation, isolation and quarantine, and special populations).
4. See Janelle A. Rhyme, Likely Ethical, Legal, and Professional Challenges Physicians Will Face
During an Influenza Pandemic, 68 N.C. MED. J. 51, 52 (2007) (listing the need for liability protection
as one of the “concerns that may contribute to a physician’s reluctance to provide care in a health crisis
situation”).
5. See Prefatory Note to UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT 4 (Nat’l Confer-
ence of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Current Draft for Consideration Concerning Reserved Sections
11 and 12, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing electronic survey sent to 10,000 American Public
Health Association (APHA) members, to which 1077 individuals responded).
6. Id.
7. Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking Those Who Know,
37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 715–16 (2002) (noting malpractice litigation’s psychological toll on
physicians).
8. See infra Parts III & IV.
9. See infra Parts III & IV.
10. See infra section IV.C.
11. See infra Parts III & IV.
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exclusion of paid workers and entities from immunity protection is imprudent
because it creates barriers to effective emergency response initiatives. Further-
more, it raises important questions of justice. While some health care providers
may refuse to participate in response activities because of liability concerns,12
those who do treat patients, perhaps at great risk to their own health, would face
potential liability rather than be rewarded for their altruism or professionalism.
This Article will offer recommendations to remedy the piecemeal, incomplete,
and confusing nature of the existing immunity scheme.13
A public health emergency can be defined as the occurrence of a health
condition or imminent threat of illness posing a high likelihood of a large
number of deaths, serious or long-term disabilities, or other significant harm to
a substantial number of people that is believed to be caused by (1) bioterrorism;
(2) a novel, or previously controlled or eliminated, infectious or biological
agent; (3) a natural disaster; (4) an accidental chemical release or a chemical
attack; or (5) a nuclear accident or attack.14 This definition excludes small-scale
events such as an isolated tornado that might impact the health of a local
community to a more limited degree. A natural disaster such as Hurricane
Katrina, however, might lead to a public health emergency if it threatens or
causes the outbreak of widespread illness.
In order to meet medical needs that will arise during a public health emer-
gency, the health care profession will have to achieve surge capacity.15 Doing so
will involve volunteers, health care professionals, public and private hospitals
and clinics, vaccine manufacturers, governmental authorities, and many others.
Operating in emergency circumstances, however, is likely to give rise to
numerous issues of liability for health care providers. Providers may face
inadequate resources, an insufficient number of qualified personnel, overwhelm-
ing demand for services, and other obstacles stemming from the natural or
man-made disaster that caused the emergency.16 In this environment, caregivers
may not be able to adhere to normal treatment procedures.17 They may be
forced to provide less-than-optimal services to many patients, which could lead
12. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text (discussing a survey of health care providers that
focused on clinicians’ concerns about liability).
13. See infra Part V.
14. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 104(m) (Ctr. for Law & the Public’s Health,
Discussion Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf.
15. See generally James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity
Through the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Public Health Emergencies and Other
Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 5 (2005). The authors define “surge capacity” as “the
number of critical casualties arriving per unit of time that can be managed without compromising the
level of care.” Id. at 7.
16. See HEALTH SYS. RESEARCH, INC., ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE IN MASS CASUALTY EVENTS 1
(2005), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/altstand/altstand.pdf [hereinafter ALTERED STANDARDS
OF CARE] (stating that mass casualty events “could compromise, at least in the short term, the ability of
local or regional health systems to deliver services consistent with established standards of care”).
17. See infra note 62 and accompanying text for discussion of the standard of care in emergency
situations.
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to injury or even death in some cases.18
If the purpose of liability is to deter misconduct and provide compensation
for injured parties,19 what standards of liability should apply in a public health
emergency? Is it appropriate to provide full or limited immunity to various
parties? As noted by Daniel Sokol, a British medical ethicist, “[i]n light of the
potentially catastrophic impact of avian influenza on human health and eco-
nomic well-being, this topic [duty of care] should engender a burst of activity
and debate in hospitals, universities, and medical journals.”20
This Article will focus on liability and immunity relating only to health care
providers. While many parties may be involved in emergency response, includ-
ing transportation workers, food suppliers, rescuers, and others, health care
providers have unique skills, qualifications, and licensing requirements. These,
in turn, can generate particular concern about liability and litigation, which may
justify immunity for public policy reasons. The Article’s recommendations will
also focus only on declared public health emergencies. Although other de-
clared21 and undeclared emergencies may give rise to similar concerns, these
types of emergencies vary widely in scope and circumstance, and are thus less
conducive to blanket immunity provisions. For example, a tornado might
destroy a residential area and a hospital, but other health care providers in the
region will be able to address adequately the medical needs of affected individu-
als. A far-reaching immunity scheme is therefore not justified for such a
scenario.
The Article proposes a comprehensive approach to immunity for health care
providers who serve as public health emergency responders to replace the
piecemeal scheme that currently exists.22 It thus responds to the demand for
legal reform that has been voiced by health care providers.23 The Article will
suggest that the federal and state public health emergency response statutes be
amended to fully address the issue of immunity for public and private sector
employees, whether they be paid or volunteers, as well as for entities that are
health care providers and are involved in response activities.
18. See HHS Pandemic Flu Plan, Executive Summary, http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/
overview.html (stating that “it is unlikely that there will be sufficient personnel, equipment, and
supplies” during a pandemic flu).
19. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (stating that the purpose of the law of torts is “directed toward the
compensation of individuals”); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 268
(2004) (“Reduction of risk through deterrence of harm is the true purpose of liability today, but
compensation and avoidance of strife were also important historically.”).
20. Daniel K. Sokol, Virulent Epidemics and Scope of Healthcare Workers’ Duty of Care, 12
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1238, 1240 (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/
vol12no08/pdfs/06-0360.pdf.
21. For a discussion of different types of emergencies, see infra notes 28–54 and accompanying text.
22. See infra section V.B.
23. INST. OF MED., ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MITIGATING PANDEMIC DISEASE 13, 65, 71
(2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11917.html (emphasizing the need for liability protec-
tion in the event of a pandemic disease outbreak).
2008] 1919RESPONDERS’ RESPONSIBILITY
The proposal is designed to balance the needs of disaster victims with those
of responders and the best interests of society at large. It aims to encourage
involvement in response efforts without excusing gross negligence and inten-
tional misconduct. In addition, the proposal is designed to control the volume of
litigation in the aftermath of a public health emergency. In such emergencies,
many if not most patients would be treated in sub-optimal conditions and would
thus not receive the level of care that they could ordinarily expect. Litigation
restrictions could help control court dockets and prevent malpractice insurance
costs from rising dramatically because health care providers would not be
inundated by lawsuits for which insurers would have to pay. Finally, the
proposal aims to regulate the quality of treatment available during public health
emergencies by addressing the degree to which volunteers should be subject to
oversight and the extent to which licensure requirements should be enforced
during emergencies. The need for widespread availability of care is thus weighed
against the importance of providing responsible medical attention.24
The Article will proceed as follows. Part I will discuss federal and state
declarations of emergency and describe the various parties whose likely involve-
ment in public health emergency response activities will make them vulnerable
to liability.
Parts II and III provide a first-of-its-kind comprehensive survey of the laws of
liability and immunity that apply to public health emergencies. This survey will
offer a valuable tool for policymakers, lawyers, and public health officials who
are preparing for and implementing public health emergency responses. Part II
will examine a variety of causes of action that might be asserted by disaster
victims, and Part III will survey sources of liability protection that are currently
found in federal and state law.
Beyond thoroughly surveying existing law, the Article provides significant
synthesis, analysis, and original recommendations. Part IV will synthesize the
contemporary immunity scheme and argue that it leaves considerable gaps and
uncertainties. Part V will analyze the ethical objectives of legal liability and the
incentives and disincentives that should be incorporated into immunity statutes.
It will also offer detailed recommendations for legislative changes in the form
of a comprehensive statutory immunity provision that promotes human welfare
and ethical conduct in the unique circumstances of public health emergencies.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: DECLARATIONS OF EMERGENCY AND EMERGENCY
RESPONDERS
Because this Article addresses liability and immunity in public health emergen-
cies, it is important to establish what a public health emergency is, how it differs
from other types of emergencies, what formal actions are taken to declare states
of emergency, and who is expected to respond to public health emergencies.
24. See infra section V.A.
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This Part analyzes these issues.
A. DECLARATIONS OF EMERGENCY
Public health emergencies raise acute concerns for health care providers
regarding liability. Natural and man-made disasters are formalized as emergen-
cies upon a declaration by a governmental authority. Emergencies can be
declared at both the federal and state levels by the President of the United
States, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), a state governor, and sometimes by other local authorities.25 In some
cases general emergencies are declared, and in other instances public health
emergencies are declared pursuant to specific statutory provisions.26 Declara-
tions of emergency allow governmental authorities to exercise special powers
and to suspend certain legal requirements that would be excessively burden-
some.27 Consequently, such declarations are often essential to achieving effec-
tive emergency responses.
1. Federal Declarations of Emergency
The President can declare an emergency or a major disaster in accordance
with the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act).28 A federal declaration of emergency may be triggered by a
governor’s request, when a governor represents that “the situation is of such
severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the
State and the affected local governments and that Federal Assistance is neces-
sary.”29 The President may also declare a federal emergency in cases involving
an area in which “the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsi-
bility and authority.”30 Such an emergency was declared by President Clinton
after the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in
1995.31 The President may also declare a major disaster when asked to do so by
a governor upon a finding that the “disaster is of such severity and magnitude
that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State.”32
Furthermore, the President may declare an emergency under the National
Emergencies Act.33 While the law does not specify the circumstances under
which an emergency might be declared, one commentator reports that Presi-
25. MARC ROBERTS ET AL., MASS MEDICAL CARE WITH SCARCE RESOURCES 27–29 (2007) [hereinafter
MASS MEDICAL CARE], http://www.ahrq.gov/research/mce/mceguide.pdf.
26. Id. at 27–28.
27. See infra notes 39–47 and accompanying text.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5206 (2000).
29. Id. § 5191(a).
30. Id. § 5191(b).
31. Letter from President William J. Clinton to James Lee Witt, Federal Emergency Management
Agency Director (Apr. 19, 1995), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?
dbname1995_public_papers_vol1_misc&page553&positionall.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 5170.
33. 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
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dents declared thirty-eight national states of emergency under the Act between
1976 and mid-2004.34 One such emergency was declared by President Bush on
September 14, 2001, after the 9/11 attacks.35
The Public Health Service Act allows the HHS Secretary to declare a public
health emergency in case of a disease, disorder, or bioterrorist attack that
justifies such a declaration.36 A “Determination that a Public Health Emergency
Exists” was made by the Secretary both on September 11, 2001,37 and on
August 31, 2005, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.38
Under section 1135 of the Social Security Act, which is also section 143(a) of
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002,39 the Secretary may waive or modify certain legal requirements that apply
to health care providers furnishing goods or services in an emergency area.40
Section 1135 waivers are authorized for a limited duration41 if the Secretary has
declared a public health emergency under the Public Health Services Act and
the President has also declared an emergency or disaster pursuant to the
National Emergencies Act or the Stafford Act.42 On September 4, 2005, for
example, in response to Hurricane Katrina, the Secretary of HHS issued a
waiver relating to five categories of legal requirements.43 The waiver addressed
the following: (1) certain conditions of participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP); (2) state licensure
requirements; (3) sanctions under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA); (4) Medicare Advantage patients’ use of out-of-network
providers; and (5) sanctions under the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) privacy regulations.44
34. Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835, 843–44 (2006).
35. Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 18, 2001).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
37. Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Determination that a
Public Health Emergency Exists (Sept. 11, 2001) (on file with author).
38. Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Determination that a Public
Health Emergency Exists (Aug. 31, 2005) (on file with author).
39. See Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 143(a), 116 Stat. 594, 627–29 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320b-5 (Supp. IV 2004)).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (Supp IV 2004). The requirements relate to the Medicare, Medicaid, and
SCHIP programs; state licensure requirements; EMTALA; and the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Id. § 1320b-
5(b); see also Elizabeth Weeks, After the Catastrophe: Disaster Relief for Hospitals, 85 N.C. L. REV.
223, 249–50 (2006) (discussing the suspension of various legal requirements in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(e).
42. Id. § 1320b-5(g)(1).
43. Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Waiver Under Section 1135 of
the Social Security Act (Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.hhs.gov/katrina/ssawaiver.html.
44. Id. For a brief discussion of EMTALA and HIPAA, see infra sections II.B.3 and II.G. Section
1135 also allows the Secretary to waive sanctions under the Stark self-referral law, which prohibits
physicians from referring patients to any entity in which they or their immediate family members have
an ownership interest or with which they have other financial relationships. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-
5(b)(4) for the waiver provision and 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn for the Stark self-referral law. These
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2. State Declarations of Emergency
Some states have public health emergency statutes that authorize the gover-
nor to declare a public health emergency.45 Typically, the statutes provide the
governor or state public health authorities with a variety of powers once a
public health emergency has been declared.46 These may include the power to
(1) suspend statutory provisions relating to state business or the rules and
regulations of state agencies, as necessary; (2) use all available state and local
resources for emergency response purposes; (3) change the functions of state
governmental agencies, as needed; (4) mobilize the state militia; (5) provide and
seek aid in cooperation with other states pursuant to relevant interstate emer-
gency compacts; and (6) seek aid from the federal government.47
Following the 9/11 attacks, the Centers for Law and the Public’s Health at
Georgetown University and Johns Hopkins University drafted the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) at the request of the CDC.48 Accord-
ing to the Center, as of July 15, 2006, thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia had incorporated at least some parts of the model act or closely
related provisions into their state laws.49
States whose laws do not specifically address public health emergencies can
declare general emergencies.50 Every state has developed a process for declar-
ing a general emergency or disaster.51 In some cases, governors may issue dual
declarations, declaring a general emergency first and a public health emergency
subsequently.52 Dual declarations, however, may lead to some confusion and
complications if procedures or powers with respect to the two types of emergen-
modifications facilitate fast and efficient patient treatment in an emergency and relieve providers of
worry concerning penalties for technical violations of various legal requirements.
45. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:766A (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-2 (West 2007); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 25-1-440(a) (2007). For a list and summary of different states’ definitions of “public health
emergency” see Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Health Res. and Servs. Admin., Emergency System
for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP)—Legal and Regulatory
Issues, app. A at 74–78 (Draft Report, May 2006) [hereinafter ESAR-VHP], available at ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/
bioterror/May_06_Legal_Report.pdf.
46. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §38-3-22 (1995 & Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 25-1-440 (2007); see
also MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 403(a) (Ctr. for Law & the Public’s Health,
Discussion Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf.
47. See supra note 46.
48. See MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 104(m) (Ctr. for Law & the Public’s Health,
Discussion Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
49. See Center for Law and the Public’s Health, Model State Public Health Laws, http://
www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/Modellaws.htm. The states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, as well as the District of Columbia.
50. ESAR-VHP, supra note 45, at 24–25. For a list of state laws and their definitions of “emergency”
or “disaster,” see id. app. B at 79–89.
51. MASS MEDICAL CARE, supra note 25, at 27.
52. Id.; ESAR-VHP, supra note 45, at 25–26.
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cies are inconsistent.53 In addition, in some jurisdictions, other authorities, such
as the state department of health or a local executive officer, can declare an
emergency.54
B. EMERGENCY RESPONDERS
Numerous parties might be involved in emergency response, and each of
them could be vulnerable to liability. Some of the key participants are likely to
be the following:
● Hospitals: Hospitals will treat patients in their own wards and emer-
gency rooms and might establish satellite operations in other locations,
such as stadiums.
● Health Care Professionals: Health care providers, such as doctors,
nurses, physician assistants, and other clinicians will provide services at
their places of employment or other sites to which they are assigned.
● Volunteers: Health care workers from unaffected areas might travel to
affected locations and volunteer their assistance. Retirees, students, and
others with some medical training might also wish to assist in providing
treatment during a public health emergency. While many will work
through volunteer registries,55 nonprofit organizations, or state agencies,
some volunteers might rush to the scene and try to operate indepen-
dently.56
● Volunteer Coordinators and Registry Operators: Entities that host or
coordinate volunteers, such as the Red Cross or volunteer registry
operators, could play a key role in emergency response. Volunteer
coordinators will supply and supervise volunteers, and registry opera-
tors, such as those associated with the Health Resources and Services
Administration’s Emergency System for Advanced Registration of Volun-
teer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP), will register volunteer respond-
53. ESAR-VHP, supra note 45, at 25–26; MASS MEDICAL CARE, supra note 25, at 28.
54. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-32-2109 (2006) (authorizing the principal executive officer of a
local political subdivision to declare a “local disaster emergency”); MO. REV. STAT. § 192.460 (2000)
(addressing radiation control and providing that when the Department of Health “finds an emergency
exists requiring immediate action to protect the public health or welfare, it may issue an order reciting
the existence of an emergency and requiring that such action be taken as it deems necessary to meet the
emergency”).
55. See James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Risk Management in the Wake of Hurricanes and Other
Disasters: Hospital Civil Liability Arising from the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During
Emergencies, 10 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 57, 60–61 (2006) (explaining that “[t]hese state-based
electronic systems seek to pre-qualify volunteers through advance verification of their credentials,
licenses, accreditations, and hospital privileges”).
56. See Memorandum from Ctr. for Law and the Public’s Health, Hurricane Katrina and Rita
Responses—Legal Lessons, http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Research/PDF/Katrina%20-%20Legal%20
Lessons%20Learned.pdf (outlining and analyzing some of the legal challenges related to “the deploy-
ment and utilization of volunteer health professionals”).
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ers and verify their credentials.57 In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
the ESAR-VHP enabled twenty-one states to send 8300 health profession-
als to assist in response efforts.58
● Federal, State, and Local Entities, Officials, and Employees: Federal,
state, and local authorities, such as public health departments and their
employees, will be involved in decisionmaking concerning various as-
pects of emergency response, including the distribution of scarce re-
sources, implementation of quarantine orders, and other matters. Public
employees, such as CDC workers, might also provide medical assis-
tance, conduct rescue operations, and perform other tasks.
● Producers of Vaccines and Other Medical Supplies: Vaccine manufactur-
ers and producers of other drugs, devices, and biologics could be asked
to greatly accelerate their rate of production in response to demand
during an emergency. Such acceleration could compromise the produc-
ers’ ability to comply with ordinary Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) protocols.59
Emergencies can be declared by the government in a variety of circum-
stances, and they can involve a multitude of responders from different segments
of society and the workforce. It can be anticipated that in the chaos of an
emergency, some of the care provided will be sub-optimal and some of the
measures taken will be greeted with hostility and challenged in court. Conse-
quently, it is appropriate to focus on potential theories of litigation, available
immunity, and the extent to which concerns about liability could affect response
activities and health outcomes.
II. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION
Once a public health emergency is declared, the various responders described
above will be expected to spring into action. They may, however, be reluctant to
do so because of the prospect of litigation, as plaintiffs might bring a large
number of causes of action against responders in the aftermath of a public
health emergency. Although negligence may be the first theory of liability to
57. ESAR-VHP, supra note 45, at 52 (discussing administration of ESAR-VHP and the liability that
might arise from such activities); UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11 (Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Current Draft for Consideration Concerning Reserved
Sections 11 and 12, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing the liability of source, coordinating, and host
entities).
58. Hospital Disaster Preparedness: Past, Present, and Future: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. 3 (2006)
(statement of John O. Agwunobi, Assistant Secretary for Health, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/Hearings/01262006hearing1772/Agwuno-
bi.pdf.
59. See Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2005, S. 1873, 109th
Cong. § 6 (establishing “liability protections for pandemic and epidemic products and security
countermeasures”).
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come to mind, it is by no means the only theory. While the different theories are
not equally likely to be asserted or to be successful, in the aggregate, their
existence might generate considerable anxiety for providers and constitute a
formidable barrier to clinicians’ participation in response activities.60 This Part
will survey and analyze the various types of cases that might be brought against
public health emergency responders.
A. NEGLIGENCE
Individuals who are dissatisfied with the care they receive during a public
health emergency or who believe they were injured because of inadequate
treatment are most likely to file negligence cases, particularly medical malprac-
tice suits. The elements of a negligence claim are (1) a duty of care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty through conduct that fails to
meet the applicable standard of care, (3) harm or injury, and (4) a causal link
between the injury and the breach of duty.61
The most complicated of these factors is the standard of care. The standard of
care in each case is fact-specific and dependent upon the particular circum-
stances at issue. It is determined based on an assessment of whether the
defendant “proceed[ed] with such reasonable caution as a prudent man would
have exercised under such circumstances.”62 Consequently, by definition, the
standard of care in an emergency would take into account the exigent conditions
in which providers were working. Some mistakes that might ordinarily consti-
tute negligence may not give rise to liability because they were reasonable or
unavoidable under the circumstances.
It should be noted that some public health commentators speak in terms of
“altered standards of care” for public health emergencies.63 Certain professional
organizations, such as the American Nursing Association and the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, are similarly formulating guidelines for “al-
tered standards of care” during emergencies.64 I do not believe that this is the
correct terminology, because the standard of care is per se flexible and fact-
dependent. Consequently, it is more accurate to state that organizations that are
60. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text (discussing data that indicates that liability concerns
influence physicians’ decisions concerning responding to emergencies).
61. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 164–68.
62. Vaughn v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff who
was injured when a fire that began in the defendant’s haystack burnt down his house); see also Barry R.
Furrow, The Problem of the Sports Doctor: Serving Two (or Is It Three or Four?) Masters, 50 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 165, 182 (2005) (explaining that the “standard of care is defined by reference to a physician
using the knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession
in good standing, good medical practice within the area of specialty practice, and reasonable, custom-
ary, accepted care under the circumstances”).
63. See ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 16.
64. See generally Jean DeDonder et al., A Report from ANA’s 2007 Quadrennial Policy Conference:
Nursing Care in Life, Death, and Disaster, KAN. NURSE, June–July 2007; ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE,
supra note 16 (discussing changes in the delivery of care in response to mass casualty events and
offering guiding principles for developing altered standards of care).
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developing guidelines for emergencies are addressing the need for “modified
care” or “modified standard procedures,” not “altered standards of care.”
At least two negligence lawsuits stemmed from the 2003 SARS outbreak in
Toronto, Canada. One is a $600 million class action, and the other is a $12
million case, and both involved nurses who became infected while working at a
Toronto hospital.65 Both allege that the province of Ontario was negligent in
handling the SARS outbreak.66 These lawsuits demonstrate that emergency
responders are in fact vulnerable to suit with respect to their handling of
response duties.
1. Corporate Negligence
Hospitals, clinics, and other health care organizations involved in emergency
response might be liable under a corporate negligence theory.67 Health care
organizations can be held liable for failing to safeguard their patients’ safety and
welfare.68 Hospitals have been found to have the following four duties:
(1) a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate
facilities and equipment; (2) a duty to select and retain only competent
physicians; (3) a duty to oversee all persons who practice medicine within its
walls as to patient care; and (4) a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce
adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the patients.69
In order to establish a prima facie case of corporate negligence, a plaintiff must
show (1) that the hospital deviated from the standard of care; (2) that the
hospital has actual or constructive knowledge of the flaws or procedures that
caused the injury; and (3) a causal link between the conduct and the harm.70
In a public health emergency such as a pandemic or bioterrorist attack, health
care organizations are likely to be under tremendous pressure to exceed ordi-
nary capacity and to handle very large numbers of patients quickly and effi-
ciently. At the height of the crisis, these entities might fail to follow standard
procedures for facility maintenance, personnel oversight, treatment protocols,
and other matters. Various deficiencies in the care provided by health care
organizations could lead to corporate negligence claims.
2. Vicarious Liability: Respondeat Superior and Ostensible Agency
Organizations can be held liable for the actions of their employees through
65. SARS Lawsuits Will Go Ahead, WINDSOR STAR, Aug. 24, 2005, at A6; SARS Suit, 173 CANADIAN
MED. ASSOC. J. 744 (2005).
66. See supra note 65.
67. See Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965) (recognizing
cause of action for corporate negligence).
68. See Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991).
69. Id. (internal citations omitted).
70. Rauch v. Mike-Mayer, 783 A.2d 815, 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
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the theories of respondeat superior and ostensible agency. The doctrine of
“respondeat superior,” literally, “let the superior answer,” establishes that an
employer is responsible for the acts of its employees in the course of their
employment.71 Thus, hospitals, for example, may be held liable for the conduct
of nurses, residents, interns, and other health professionals. In many instances,
physicians are considered independent contractors rather than employees, and
this status shields hospitals from liability for their acts.72 At times, however,
courts have found that a hospital’s imposition of rules and regulations upon staff
physicians is enough to undercut the doctors’ independent contractor status and
expose the hospital to liability.73
An alternative theory of liability is ostensible agency. Even if a doctor is
found to be an independent contractor, a hospital might be liable for her
wrongdoing if the doctor is deemed to be its “ostensible agent.”74 A court can
find ostensible agency if (1) the patient looks to the entity rather than the
specific physician for care, and (2) the hospital “holds out” the doctor as its
employee.75 The ostensible agency theory is particularly applicable to emer-
gency room care, as patients generally seek medical treatment from emergency
departments without regard to who the attending physician will be.76 The
ostensible agency theory is likely to be particularly relevant in cases arising
from public health emergencies. In the event of a pandemic or epidemic of
virulent influenza, bioterrorist attack, or other emergencies, patients are likely to
flood emergency rooms rather than turn to individual physicians.
B. PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Negligence is not the only theory that plaintiffs might use to sue emergency
responders. In public health emergencies involving untold numbers of victims,
health care providers might not have the luxury of safeguarding the privacy of
71. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004).
72. See, e.g., Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Wis. 1992) (holding that even though a
physician was a member of the hospital’s staff and was required to comply with hospital policies, no
master-servant relationship existed); Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1044 (Ohio 1990)
(finding that the physician’s staff privileges did not make the hospital vulnerable to respondeat superior
liability for his actions).
73. See, e.g., Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (finding
that a physician was a hospital employee rather than an independent contractor because the hospital
controlled the way he operated its emergency room). See generally Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. &
Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital Liability for Torts of Independent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.C. L.
REV. 431 (1996).
74. See Simmons v. St. Clair Mem’l Hosp., 481 A.2d 870, 874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
75. Id.; Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 95–96 (W. Va. 2004) (discussing
ostensible agency theory and proof criteria).
76. See Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d 684, 692 (W. Va. 1991) (“[W]here a hospital makes
emergency room treatment available to serve the public as an integral part of its facilities, the hospital is
estopped to deny that the physicians and other medical personnel on duty providing treatment are its
agents. Regardless of any contractual arrangements with so-called independent contractors, the hospital
is liable to the injured patient for acts of malpractice committed in its emergency room, so long as the
requisite proximate cause and damages are present.”).
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all patient information. Furthermore, they may be under significant pressure to
provide information to members of the media who will aggressively cover the
story twenty-four hours a day. Physicians thus may inadvertently leave medical
records where they can be seen by third parties or disclose the details of certain
patients’ conditions to reporters. The legal provisions that address breaches of
privacy and confidentiality are discussed in this subsection.
1. The Tort of Invasion of Privacy
In limited circumstances in which responders publicly disclose private medi-
cal facts concerning patients, the affected individuals might turn to the common
law tort cause of action for invasion of privacy.77 Under the common law, the
right to privacy can be invaded by “unreasonable publicity given to the other’s
private life.”78
The tort of invasion of privacy consists of four elements: (a) public disclo-
sure; (b) of a private fact; (c) that would be objectionable and offensive to a
reasonable person; and (d) that is not of legitimate public concern.79 In the
words of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[e]very individual has some
phases of his life and his activities and some facts about himself that he does not
expose to the public eye . . . . [including] many unpleasant or disgraceful or
humiliating illnesses.”80
2. The Tort of Breach of Confidentiality
In the alternative, plaintiffs could utilize the tort theory of breach of confiden-
tiality.81 The elements of breach of confidentiality are (1) the existence of a
doctor-patient relationship, and (2) a physician’s or medical entity’s disclosure
to a third party of confidential information that was gained pursuant to this
relationship.82 In Horne v. Patton, for example, a claim was brought for
wrongful disclosure of medical information to a patient’s employer.83 The court
ruled that a doctor has a duty not to disclose patient information obtained in the
course of treatment and that a private cause of action exists in cases where the
duty is breached.84 Courts have based the patient’s right of confidentiality upon
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); Eduardo W. Gonzalez, Comment, “Get
That Camera Out of My Face!” An Examination of the Viability of Suing “Tabloid Television” for
Invasion of Privacy, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 935, 939–44 (1997) (discussing the applicability and internal
limitations of the invasion of privacy tort).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
79. See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (reporting that the
jury found defendant liable for publicizing fact that plaintiff had gender-corrective surgery).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
81. See Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Common
Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 652–58 (2002) (discussing the common law tort theory of breach of
confidentiality and its implications).
82. Kimberly Rathbone, The Strict Ohio Supreme Court Decisions in Biddle: Third Party Law Firm
Held Liable for Including Disclosure of Medical Information, 15 J.L. & HEALTH 189, 196–97 (2001).
83. Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 825–26 (Ala. 1973).
84. Id. at 829–30.
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a variety of sources, including privilege statutes protecting physician-patient
communications, licensing statutes prohibiting the disclosure of patient informa-
tion without authorization, and medical ethics principles articulated in the
Hippocratic Oath and other sources.85 An action for breach of confidentiality
can be maintained regardless of the degree to which the information has been
publicly distributed or its offensiveness, and there is no requirement to prove
the intent of the perpetrator.86
3. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy
Rule requires health care providers to safeguard patient privacy in a variety of
ways. For example, with some exceptions, covered entities must obtain a
patient’s permission before speaking to third parties about the individual’s
medical condition,87 distribute privacy notices containing information concern-
ing use and disclosure of patients’ health records,88 allow patients to inspect
their health records and request that they be modified or used restrictively,89 and
implement various administrative, physical, and technical security measures for
systems storing electronic health records.90 In an emergency in which relatives
and the media are clamoring for information about patients, and unprecedented
volumes of health records must be processed, many of these requirements might
be impractical or unrealistic. It should be noted that HIPAA does not offer a
private cause of action to aggrieved individuals, though it does provide for
governmental enforcement.91 The regulations also establish exceptions for disclo-
sures and use of protected health information for purposes of public health
activities and the aversion of serious threats to public health and safety.92
C. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE REHABILITATION ACT
In a public health emergency, responders might find it difficult to care
properly for individuals with disabilities and to accommodate all of their
needs.93 For example, hastily established field clinics may not be fully acces-
sible to people with particular disabilities, American Sign Language interpreters
may not be available to communicate with the deaf, and written materials that
are distributed to the public may not be produced in Braille for the blind. These
85. Winn, supra note 81, at 654–55.
86. Id. at 657–58 (comparing the torts of invasion of privacy and breach of confidentiality).
87. 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (2007).
88. Id. § 164.520(a).
89. Id. §§ 164.520, 164.522.
90. Id. §§ 164.302–164.318.
91. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.300–160.552; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health,
and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331,
337, 342 (2007).
92. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512.
93. See ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 16, at 30–31 (discussing concerns relating to care
for populations with special needs).
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difficulties might give rise to claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)94 or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.95
Title II of the ADA prohibits disability-based discrimination with respect to
public services.96 Individuals with disabilities may not be denied the benefits of
programs, activities, and services, such as public transportation provided by
public entities, nor can they be subjected to discrimination by such entities
because of their disabilities.97
Title III of the ADA prohibits disability-based discrimination by public
accommodations.98 A “public accommodation” is a private entity whose opera-
tions affect commerce, including a “pharmacy, insurance office, professional
office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment.”99
Public transportation services provided by private entities are covered under this
Title.100 Both Title II and Title III provide a private cause of action for
aggrieved individuals.101 Under Title II, however, private plaintiffs may seek
only injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs, though the Attorney General
may pursue damages on behalf of discrimination victims.102 In addition, under
the ADA, covered entities need not accommodate individuals with disabilities if
doing so would constitute an undue hardship.103
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973104 is narrower than the ADA
but will be pertinent to some circumstances arising from a public health
emergency. The law establishes that qualified individuals with disabilities may
not be excluded from, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination by
covered programs and activities solely because of their disabilities.105 Those
covered by this section include programs or activities that receive federal
financial assistance and those conducted by an executive agency of the United
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165.
97. Id. § 12132. A “public entity” is defined as (1) a state or local government; (2) an instrumentality
of a state or local government; or (3) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation and any other
commuter authority. Id. § 12131. Damages have been allowed against states in Title II cases. In
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), the Supreme Court held that private citizens may sue a state
under Title II of the ADA to enforce their right of access to a courthouse and that Eleventh Amendment
immunity did not bar such an action.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189.
99. Id. § 12181(7)(F).
100. Id. § 12184.
101. Id. §§ 12133, 12188.
102. Id. §12188(a)–(b); see also James C. Harrington, The ADA and Section 1983: Walking Hand in
Hand, 19 REV. LITIG. 435, 441 (2000) (discussing the availability of damages under the ADA).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 51 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 474 (stating that “title II incorporates the regulations applicable to federally
conducted activities under Section 504 with respect to program accessibility, existing facilities and
communications, which requires that the agency demonstrate that access cannot be accomplished
without imposing an undue burden after considering all available resources”).
104. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
105. Id. § 794(a).
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States or the U.S. Postal Service.106 Organizations providing health care ser-
vices that receive federal assistance are specifically mentioned as covered
entities.107 The Rehabilitation Act, like the ADA, exempts accommodations that
would impose an undue burden on an entity.108
The federal government has recognized the importance of considering the
needs of individuals with disabilities in developing emergency preparedness
plans. The Department of Justice has issued guidance for local governments
entitled “Making Community Emergency Preparedness and Response Programs
Accessible to People with Disabilities.”109 A 2006 report issued by the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security found that individuals with disabilities were inad-
equately integrated into emergency readiness plans and urged improvements in
the areas of evacuation, transportation, communication, emergency public infor-
mation, sheltering, and health services.110 In addition, President Bush issued
Executive Order 13,347 on July 22, 2004, which is entitled “Individuals with
Disabilities in Emergency Preparedness” and promotes consideration of the
safety and security of the disabled during emergencies.111 The Executive Order
established the Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness
and Individuals with Disabilities in the Department of Homeland Security.112
Furthermore, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act113 added section
2814 concerning “at-risk individuals” to the Public Health Service Act.114 This
section provides that the HHS Secretary will “oversee the implementation of the
National Preparedness goal of taking into account the public health and medical
needs of at-risk individuals in the event of a public health emergency.”115
Finally, The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 created
the position of Disability Coordinator in the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA).116
Individuals who feel mistreated during a public health emergency would face
several hurdles in asserting claims under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.
They would be required to prove that the alleged wrong was due specifically to
106. Id.; see also Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (involving a challenge to
the U.S. Office of Personnel Management’s health insurance plan and stating that the Office was subject
to section 504 because it was an executive agency of the United States).
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3)(A)(ii).
108. See 28 C.F.R. § 39.150(a)(2) (2007).
109. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN ADA GUIDE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: MAKING COMMUNITY EMER-
GENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PROGRAMS ACCESSIBLE TO PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/emerprepguideprt.pdf.
110. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONWIDE PLAN REVIEW PHASE 2 REPORT 41, 46–47 (June
16, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Prep_NationwidePlanReview.pdf.
111. Executive Order No. 13,347, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,573, 44,573 (July 22, 2004).
112. Id.
113. Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831 (2006).
114. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300hh-16 (West Supp. 2007).
115. Id. § 300hh-16(1). “At-risk individuals” are defined as “children, pregnant women, senior
citizens and other individuals who have special needs in the event of a public health emergency, as
determined by the Secretary.” Id. § 300hh-1(b)(4)(B).
116. 6 U.S.C.A. § 321b (West 2006).
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their disability rather than to general exigent circumstances and that the defen-
dant could have accommodated their needs without undue hardship despite the
crisis. Nevertheless, in some cases of egregious misconduct that is injurious to
people with disabilities, disability discrimination claims could be successful.
For example, if individuals with disabilities are deemed to be a low priority for
triaging purposes because officials prefer saving the lives of healthier people,
ADA violations could be found.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Aggrieved individuals might assert constitutional claims in addition to tort
allegations if they are dissatisfied with the treatment they received from public
entities or officials during a public health emergency. Possible theories include
violation of bodily integrity; deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; or infringement of equal protection rights.117 For example, if a
community of African-Americans feels that it was mistreated or underserved
during an emergency because the individuals are black, the group might file suit
alleging equal protection violations. Those subject to forced vaccinations or
quarantines might sue for violations of liberty or bodily integrity under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Individual state officials could also be sued for violation of civil rights under
§ 1983,118 which provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, [or] regulation . . . of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.”119 The statute does not provide a
cause of action against state entities120 but can be an effective litigation vehicle
against state officials who are challenged in their individual capacity.121 Under
the Supreme Court’s Bivens122 doctrine, suit is similarly authorized against
federal officials.
E. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Some conduct on the part of health care providers could also give rise to
criminal liability. For example, if a physician withholds or withdraws treatment
from critically ill patients or prescribes excessive pain medication to them,
thereby expediting death, she may face criminal charges.123 In 2005, Louisi-
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice
Tort Doctrine: Courts on a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 75 (2003).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
119. Id.
120. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (asserting that states are not “persons” for
purposes of section 1983 claims for money damages).
121. MARK R. BROWN & KIT KINPORTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION UNDER § 1983, at 192 (2003).
122. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395
(1971) (allowing for damages to redress Fourth Amendment violations by federal officials).
123. See State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 213, 224 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (recounting conviction of
doctor for attempted murder of one patient and intentional and malicious second-degree murder of
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ana’s attorney general launched an investigation into allegations that elderly
patients had been euthanized in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Kat-
rina.124 The attorney general ultimately decided not to pursue charges against
two nurses that were allegedly implicated, and the grand jury declined to issue
an indictment against the accused physician, Dr. Anna Pou.125 Patient deaths
during future public health emergencies might lead to similar accusations.126
When an emergency strikes and the demand for respirators exceeds supply, for
example, physicians might be tempted to remove respirators from hospitalized
elderly patients in order to give them to newly admitted younger patients, who
are more likely to live long and productive lives if they recover. Such acts,
however, could be considered killings under criminal law. In addition, health
care providers who perform medical procedures for which they are not licensed
could be criminally prosecuted under state statutes that establish the permissible
scope of practice for various professionals.127
F. THE TORT OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A separate tort for which plaintiffs might be awarded damages is breach of
fiduciary duty, which arises from a fiduciary’s obligation to promote the inter-
ests of his beneficiaries rather than his own interests.128 A key aspect of
fiduciaries is that they are entrusted with the power and discretion to make
certain decisions that cannot be monitored or limited ahead of time by the
entrustor.129 As a result, the law imposes certain obligations on the fiduciary.
Fiduciary duties consist of a duty of care, which requires diligence of fiduciaries
who are making decisions on behalf of beneficiaries, and a duty of loyalty,
which obligates fiduciaries to promote the beneficiaries’ best interests instead of
their own.130 Fiduciary principles have been applied to a diverse variety of
relationships, including trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, insurance company-
insured, priest-penitent, and bank-customer.131
second patient because of medications doctor administered when patients were critically ill); Giles R.
Scofield, Exposing Some Myths About Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 473, 480
(1995) (stating that a physician who discontinues life-sustaining treatment on her own initiative could
be prosecuted).
124. Bruce Weber, Storm and Crisis: Hospital Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A19.
125. Susan Okie, Dr. Pou and the Hurricane—Implications for Patient Care During Disasters, 358
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 1 (2008).
126. See generally Kenneth Kipnis, Forced Abandonment and Euthanasia: A Question from Katrina,
74 SOC. RES. 79 (2007) (exploring circumstances under which it might be justifiable to withhold scarce
medical resources from some patients during an emergency).
127. Mary Beck, Improving America’s Health Care: Authorizing Independent Prescriptive Privileges
for Advanced Practice Nurses, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 951, 967 (1995) (providing the example of nurses who
engage in practices that exceed the limitations delineated in the Nurse Practice Act).
128. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1392–93 (2000).
129. See E. Haavi Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as Fiduciary: Discarding a Misguided Idea,
33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 586, 588 (2005).
130. See Carl H. Coleman, Duties to Subjects in Clinical Research, 58 VAND. L. REV. 387, 425–26
(2005) (discussing the two components of fiduciary obligations).
131. Id. at 425.
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Plaintiffs may find little success bringing breach of fiduciary duty claims
against physicians or other clinicians.132 Courts have often held that such claims
were equivalent to medical malpractice claims and could not be sustained
separately.133 The Supreme Court has also cast doubt on the ability of plaintiffs
to sue health care entities for breach of fiduciary duty.134 However, some claims
of egregious misconduct by providers might be sustainable.135 For example, if a
medical director were to subordinate patients’ interests in an emergency by
denying medical tests that could be conducted despite scarce resources or by
refusing to refer patients to available specialists purely for profit motives, the
patients might be able to sue successfully for breach of fiduciary duty under
state law.136
G. VIOLATION OF OTHER FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES
Many other laws could be inadvertently or intentionally violated during a
public health emergency. A comprehensive list is beyond the scope of this
Article, but a few representative examples follow.
● State constitutions generally contain their own equality mandates,137
which might be violated in the context of emergency response. Many
states also have civil rights statutes that prohibit discrimination based on
disability138 or other protected classifications,139 which could form the
basis for litigation.
132. See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1137,
1154–73 (2006) (discussing factors that are undermining fiduciary protections).
133. See, e.g., D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the claim
for breach of fiduciary duty was a mischaracterized claim for malpractice); Spoor v. Serota, 852 P.2d
1292, 1294–95 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty
duplicated their malpractice cause of action).
134. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 214–15 (2000) (involving a petitioner whose appendix
ruptured because of an HMO’s delay in treatment and holding that the HMO’s mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions do not constitute fiduciary acts under ERISA).
135. See, e.g., Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757, 760–61 (D.N.H. 1997) (allowing claim
for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA against an HMO because it allegedly made false statements
and misrepresentations to beneficiaries).
136. See Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemption for State Law Liability for
Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4, 41–44 (2001) (arguing that HMOs may be sued
under state fiduciary laws); Mehlman, supra note 132, at 1172 (arguing that patients should be allowed
to use breach of fiduciary duty theories to sue doctors for dishonest medical mistakes and that “the
attacks on fiduciary principles must be turned back”).
137. Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195,
1196–97 (1985).
138. See Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection Against
Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075, 1113–14 (2002) (discussing how the protection
offered by state statutes compares to that available under the ADA).
139. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(a) (LexisNexis 2007) (providing that it is unlawful
“[f]or any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry
of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that
person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter
directly or indirectly related to employment”).
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● State licensure requirements for health care professionals may be vio-
lated in cases where volunteer clinicians who are licensed in one state
travel to another state to provide emergency assistance or perform tasks
for which they are not credentialed.140
● EMTALA requires that hospital emergency rooms screen all patients
who seek treatment from them for an emergency condition.141 Individu-
als found to have such a condition must either be stabilized or trans-
ferred to another hospital if doing so will not excessively endanger
them, regardless of their ability to pay.142 The statute provides for both
administrative penalties and a private cause of action for those ag-
grieved by EMTALA violations.143 Emergency rooms that are flooded
with patients during a catastrophic event might not be able to comply
with EMTALA’s mandates.
● Emergency responders might also find it difficult to comply with com-
plex Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP rules relating to payment for
services.144
H. SUMMARY
As mentioned previously, during a public health emergency, health care
providers may not be vulnerable to sanctions and penalties under some of the
above provisions. Certain requirements relating to EMTALA, HIPAA, and the
Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP programs may be modified or waived when the
HHS Secretary has declared a public health emergency and the President has
declared an emergency or disaster pursuant to the Stafford Act or the National
Emergencies Act, as was done in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.145 Simi-
larly, under some state emergency laws,146 the governor of a state may modify
or suspend statutory provisions relating to state business or state agency rules
and regulations if compliance with those laws would likely hinder response
140. See ESAR-VHP, supra note 45, at 29 (discussing state laws that mandate licensing of health
care professionals).
141. 42 U.S.C § 1395dd(a) (2000).
142. Id. § 1395dd(b)–(c).
143. Id. § 1395dd(d) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
144. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 § 143, 42
U.S.C. § 1320b-5(b) (Supp. IV 2004) (addressing the applicability of these standards during a public
health emergency that is declared by the HHS Secretary); Weeks, supra note 40, at 249–50.
145. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(b), (e) (Supp. IV
2004) (discussing Secretary’s authority “to temporarily waive or modify the application of” certain
provisions and the duration of the waiver); Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., Waiver Under Section 1135 of the Social Security Act (Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.hhs.gov/katrina/
ssawaiver.html (waiving various requirements of EMTALA, HIPAA, Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP
following Hurricane Katrina).
146. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of the MSEHPA by state
legislatures).
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activities or exacerbate the threat to public welfare.147
Nevertheless, a large number of causes of action are theoretically available to
those who wish to challenge emergency response activities. Responders’ con-
cerns about liability, consequently, are not ungrounded and may well affect their
willingness to serve during public health emergencies. I now turn to an explora-
tion of the extent to which emergency responders might enjoy immunity with
respect to lawsuits associated with public health emergencies.
III. THE EXISTING IMMUNITY LANDSCAPE
Responders are not as vulnerable to liability as the existence of so many
causes of action might suggest. Numerous sources of immunity are available to
different parties involved in public health emergencies. This Part provides an
overview of immunity protections under federal and state laws that apply to
public sector actors, volunteers, and private sector responders.
A. IMMUNITY FOR PUBLIC SECTOR ACTORS
Public sector actors may be protected by government immunity for tort
claims, immunity for constitutional claims, and immunity arising from mutual
aid agreements.148
1. Government Immunity for Tort Claims
Federal, state, and local governmental entities and their employees or agents
who respond to a public health emergency within the scope of their official
duties may be protected against tort lawsuits by state or federal immunity
statutes.149 Under the common law, the states and the federal government are
shielded by sovereign immunity from tort actions,150 and immunity extends to
federal and state agencies as well.151
Most states, however, have enacted laws that limit state sovereign immu-
nity,152 and a determination as to whether responders associated with a state or
local governmental entity can be sued in state court for a tort will thus depend
147. See COLO. REV. STAT. §24-32-2104(7)(a) (2006) (allowing the governor to “[s]uspend the
provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state business or the
orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency, if strict compliance with the provisions of any statute,
order, rule, or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the
emergency”); MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT art. IV, § 403 (Ctr. for Law & the Public’s
Health, Discussion Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf.
148. Public sector actors may also be protected under state law. See discussion infra section III.D.
149. See, e.g., David B. Resnik, Liability for Institutional Review Boards, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 131, 172
(2004).
150. See DAN DOBBS & PAUL HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 393 (2001) (explaining that the
concept of sovereign immunity is a carryover from the English common law, which established that
“[t]he King can do no wrong”).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 394.
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on the relevant state law.153 Nevertheless, states generally retain immunity for
officials’ discretionary decisions.154
Many state courts have decided cases involving emergency response. In City
of Daytona Beach v. Palmer, the Florida Supreme Court found against plaintiff
who had alleged negligence on the part of the city’s firefighters.155 It held that
decisions concerning how to fight a fire or rescue victims and what equipment
to send to a fire were discretionary judgments subject to immunity.156 Similarly,
in Ayres v. Indian Heights Volunteer Fire Department, the Supreme Court of
Indiana found that the state’s Tort Claims Act protects government entities and
their employees from liability relating to negligence claims associated with
discretionary functions, and that the defendants were therefore entitled to
immunity with respect to allegations of negligent conduct arising from response
to a fire.157 By contrast, in Gordon v. City of Henderson, the Tennessee Supreme
Court preserved negligence claims alleging that firemen were intoxicated and
absent from their duty station because these failures did not fall within the
“discretionary function” exception of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liabil-
ity Act.158
Like the states, the federal government has generally waived its sovereign
immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).159 The FTCA, however,
retains immunity for federal officials who execute their statutory or regulatory
duties with due care and are sued in federal court.160 Immunity is also preserved
for cases involving a “failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,”161 as
well as for claims of assault, battery, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights, among others.162 These exceptions may apply to many
federal officials who are accused of misconduct while performing duties related
to emergency response.
In Berkovitz v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that the defense of
sovereign immunity applies only when a federal employee’s actions are a matter
153. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Michie 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §24-10-106 (West
2006); GA. CODE ANN. §50-21-23 (2006); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §101.021 (2005).
154. John V. Jacobi, Prison Health, Public Health: Obligations and Opportunities, 31 AM. J.L. &
MED. 447, 477 (2005) (noting that states retain immunity for discretionary judgments despite instituting
limited waivers of liability). See generally, Ken Lerner, Governmental Negligence Liability Exposure in
Disaster Management, 23 URB. LAW., 333–53 (1991) (discussing various sources of immunity for
governmental actors involved in emergency response). Lerner concludes that “[t]ort suits over alleged
flaws in disaster response have almost always been dismissed.” Id. at 352.
155. City of Daytona Beach v. Palmer, 469 So.2d 121, 122 (Fla. 1985).
156. Id. at 123.
157. Ayres v. Indian Heights Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 493 N.E.2d 1229, 1234–35 (Ind. 1986).
158. Gordon v. City of Henderson, 766 S.W.2d 784, 786–87 (Tenn. 1989).
159. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671–2680 (West 2007).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 2680(h).
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of choice and that it is based on considerations of public policy.163 The
discretionary functions exception will not apply when a statute, regulation, or
policy specifically prohibits the course of action in question.164 Consequently,
the FTCA’s exemption did not bar causes of action relating to the National
Institutes of Health’s licensing a vaccine without receiving required safety data
or determining compliance with applicable standards, or to the FDA’s approval
of unsafe vaccine lots contrary to its own policy.165 Similarly, in Downs v.
United States, the court found that the actions of a Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) agent in response to a plane hijacking were not entitled to immunity
as discretionary functions under the FTCA because he failed to follow standard
FBI procedures.166 By contrast, in Kennewick Irrigation District v. United
States, the Ninth Circuit found that the FTCA’s discretionary function exception
barred the plaintiffs’ claim of negligence relating to the design of an irrigation
canal.167 However, the exception did not apply to a claim based on negligent
construction of the canal because workers were bound by safety and engineer-
ing standards that removed their discretion.168
2. Immunity for Constitutional Claims
The defense of governmental immunity will often be available for constitu-
tional claims against state and federal governmental entities and their employ-
ees. First, the Eleventh Amendment provides that states cannot be sued for
damages in federal court.169 Eleventh Amendment immunity has been inter-
preted to extend to cases asserting constitutional claims in state court170 and to
agencies and other arms of the state.171 The amendment bars all suits for
damages or retroactive relief against state governments that are sued by any
party other than a different state or the federal government.172 Likewise, the
163. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988).
164. Id. at 536.
165. Id. at 542–47.
166. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 994–98 (6th Cir. 1975).
167. Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 1989).
168. Id. at 1026–27.
169. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The text reads as follows: “The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Id.
Congress can abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, but only if it passes legislation under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives it “power to enforce [that Amendment] by appropriate
legislation.” BROWN & KINPORTS, supra note 121, at 196.
170. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that “the powers delegated to Congress
under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting
States to private suits for damages in state courts”).
171. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323
U.S. 459, 463 (1945); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 985 (5th ed. 2003).
172. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (6th ed. 2000); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment
Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1685–86 (1997).
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doctrine of federal sovereign immunity protects the United States from being
sued without its consent.173 Entities such as Veterans’ Administration hospitals
could therefore not be sued for money damages for constitutional violations. By
contrast, county or city hospitals could be sued under federal law because
Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to local government entities.174
Second, while the Eleventh Amendment does not extend to public officials,
the defense of qualified immunity shields federal and state government officials
who are performing discretionary functions in their official capacities from
liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”175 Consequently, individual governmental actors can be held liable
only if they could be expected to have known that their actions would result in a
violation of rights.176 Proving such knowledge is difficult, but not impossible.
To illustrate, in Lazaro v. University of Texas Health Science Center, the
court found against a student who had been dismissed from medical school and
alleged violations of his equal protection and due process rights.177 The court
held that the medical school was entitled to sovereign immunity and its Interim
President and Associate Dean were entitled to qualified immunity in their
official capacities.178 Similarly, in Martinez v. Simonetti, the Second Circuit
held that a police officer was entitled to qualified immunity in a case challeng-
ing an arrest because his decision to arrest the plaintiff was a discretionary
function and his conduct was reasonable.179 By contrast, in In re Cincinnati
Radiation Litigation, the court rejected the defendants’ claim of qualified
immunity relating to experimental radiation treatments to which the plaintiffs
did not consent.180 The court found that the defendants’ egregious misconduct
violated the plaintiffs’ clearly established due process right to liberty and bodily
integrity.181
Whether constitutional immunity is available to state and federal officials will
depend on the circumstances of each case, though such a defense is likely to
apply in many instances. It is significant to note, however, that the CDC and
state and local governmental agencies have been engaging in extensive public
173. See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 150.
174. Id. at 1057; see Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978).
175. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183,
191 (1984) (stating that “[w]hether an official may prevail in his qualified immunity defense depends
upon the ‘objective reasonableness of [his] conduct as measured by reference to clearly established
law’”).
176. See cases cited supra note 175. If the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of clearly established
law in the complaint, the defendant will be entitled to dismissal of the suit prior to the commencement
of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., In re Cincinnati Radiation
Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
177. Lazaro v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 830 S.W.2d 330, 331, 333 (Tex. App. 1992).
178. Id. at 332–33.
179. Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 635 (2d Cir. 2000).
180. Cincinnati Radiation, 874 F. Supp. at 822.
181. Id. at 810–13.
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health emergency preparedness training activities for a number of years.182
These programs include discussions of appropriate investigative methods, quar-
antine, and other practices that affect civil rights.183 It is possible that parties
will rely on such well-publicized programs in litigating constitutional cases.
Plaintiffs may try to overcome qualified immunity defenses by alleging that
government officials deviated from the proper procedures that they had been
taught and thus should not be entitled to immunity. Conversely, defendants who
adhered to guidelines they were trained to follow could use their training and
compliance with guidelines for defense purposes.
3. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact and Other Mutual Aid
Agreements: Immunity for States and Their Officers or Employees
In 1996, Congress approved the Emergency Management Assistance Com-
pact (EMAC).184 EMAC is a mutual aid agreement that has been enacted by all
states and is triggered by a gubernatorial declaration of emergency and request
for assistance.185 It establishes licensure reciprocity, providing that individuals
who hold licenses, certificates, or permits issued by one state shall be deemed to
have the appropriate credentials for purposes of rendering assistance to another
state requesting aid pursuant to the compact.186 EMAC also provides immunity
to any “party state or its officers or employees” offering assistance in another
state in accordance with the compact, so long as the party acted in good faith;
that is, without willful misconduct, gross negligence, or recklessness.187
182. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), amended by
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831 (2006) (establishing
grants for state and local governments to undertake goals designed to enhance public health emergency
preparedness); CDC Public Health Law Program, http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/about.asp (describing the
emergency preparedness activities of the CDC’s Public Health Law Program).
183. See, e.g., CDC Public Health Law Program, Public Health Emergency Law & Forensic
Epidemiology Training, http://www2.cdc.gov/phlp/phel.asp (offering training concerning a variety of
legal topics including “Protection of People” and “Management of Property”); University of Minnesota
Center for Public Health Preparedness, Free Online Trainings and Resources, http://www.sph.umn.edu/
umncphp/phet.html (offering computer training modules that include the topics of disease surveillance
and investigation, contact investigation, isolation and quarantine, and special populations).
184. H.R.J. Res. 193, 104th Cong., § 1, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996).
185. Id. at 3877 (stating that “[t]he purpose of this compact is to provide for mutual assistance
between the states entering into this compact in managing any emergency disaster that is duly declared
by the Governor of the affected state, whether arising from natural disaster, technological hazard,
man-made disaster, civil emergency aspects of resources shortages, community disorders, insurgency,
or enemy attack”); Daniel D. Stier & Richard A. Goodman, Mutual Aid Agreements: Essential Legal
Tools for Public Health Preparedness and Response, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S62, S62 (2007).
186. H.R.J. Res. 193, at 3880.
187. Id. The liability provision states:
Officers or employees of a party state rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact
shall be considered agents of the requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes; and
no party state or its officers or employees rendering aid in another state pursuant to this
compact shall be liable on account of any act or omission in good faith on the part of such
forces while so engaged or on account of the maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies
2008] 1941RESPONDERS’ RESPONSIBILITY
EMAC, however, does not elucidate who exactly can be considered officers
or employees of a party state.188 For example, does the term include individuals
who are deputized by a state for the purpose of responding to a particular
emergency, such as Hurricane Katrina?189 This problem has been addressed
explicitly by a few state statutes that deem responders under EMAC to be state
employees for liability purposes,190 but it is ignored in many other states.
According to one source, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, “many states
were unable or uncertain about how to avail themselves of the services of
volunteers” who offered their assistance.191
Several states have also entered into regional mutual aid agreements. Ex-
amples are the Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, which
authorizes cooperation among Washington, Idaho, Oregon, Alaska, British Co-
lumbia, and the Yukon Territory,192 and the International Emergency Manage-
ment Assistance Memorandum of Understanding, which provides for mutual
assistance among several Northeastern states and Canadian provinces in manag-
ing emergencies stemming from natural or man-made disasters and technologi-
cal hazards.193 Some regional agreements offer immunity to participants and
others do not.194
in connection therewith. Good faith in this article shall not include willful misconduct, gross
negligence, or recklessness.
Id.
188. ESAR-VHP, supra note 45, at 48.
189. Dan Stier, Liability Protection for Volunteers Under the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact, (April 10, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing the efforts of some
states to secure liability protection for teams of volunteers sent to assist in recovery efforts after
Hurricane Katrina).
190. See IND. CODE ANN. § 10-14-3-19(d) (West 2006) (providing that when “a mobile support unit is
deployed outside Indiana under the emergency management assistance compact, an individual serving
as a member of a mobile support unit who is not an employee of the state is considered an employee of
the state for purposes of the compact”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135.143.2 (2007) (providing that a “member
of a public health response team . . . shall be considered an employee of the state under [EMAC and]
. . . shall be afforded protection as an employee of the state under [state law]”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
37-B, § 784-A (2006) (providing that a health care provider “designated by the Maine Emergency
Management Agency to render aid in another state under [EMAC] . . . is deemed to be an employee of
the State for purposes of immunity from liability”).
191. Stier & Goodman, supra note 185.
192. Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrangement, Annex B, art. I (2005) (on file with
author) [hereinafter PNEMA].
193. International Emergency Management Assistance Memorandum of Understanding (July 18,
2000), available at http://www.scics.gc.ca/cinfo00/85007918_e.html [hereinafter IEMAMOU] (entered
into by Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Quebec, New
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland); see also Memorandum of
Agreement (on file with author) [hereinafter MOA] (entered into by public health laboratories of New
Mexico, Colorado, Utah, and Arizona for purpose of establishing terms of providing assistance in the
event that one of the laboratories is temporarily disabled); Memorandum of Understanding (Aug. 15,
2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter MOU] (entered into by public health laboratories of Alaska,
Idaho, Oregon, and Washington to address potential laboratory surge capacity).
194. See IEMAMOU, supra note 193, art. VI (providing immunity for good faith acts and omissions
but not for willful misconduct, gross negligence or recklessness); MOA, supra note 193, art. 8
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B. IMMUNITY FOR VOLUNTEERS
Volunteers responding to public health emergencies will enjoy extensive
liability protection under a variety of laws, including Good Samaritan laws and
volunteer protection acts.195
1. Good Samaritan Laws
Good Samaritan statutes are state laws that protect health care professionals
or other individuals who render aid at the scene of an accident or emergency
against civil liability for negligently causing injury while providing assis-
tance.196 Most statutes shield volunteers from civil liability for ordinary negli-
gence but not for gross negligence or wanton misconduct, and apply only to
those volunteering in good faith and without compensation in response to an
emergency,197 though some statutes cover paid emergency care providers as
well.198 Thus, for example, the Georgia Good Samaritan statute provides as
follows:
Any person, including any person licensed to practice medicine and surgery
. . . who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident or
emergency to the victim or victims thereof without making any charge
therefore shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or
omission by such person in rendering emergency care or as a result of any act
or failure to act to provide or arrange for further medical treatment or care for
the injured person.199
Good Samaritan statutes generally cover only individual rescuers and thus
would not extend to hospitals, businesses, and other entities providing goods
and services at no charge.200
(establishing that “[e]ach party shall be solely responsible for fiscal or other sanctions occasioned as a
result of its own violation or alleged violation of requirements applicable to the performance of the
agreement”); MOU, supra note 193 (stating that each party “shall be responsible for its own acts and
omissions”); PNEMA, supra note 192, art. VI (providing immunity for good faith acts and omissions
but not for willful misconduct, gross negligence or recklessness).
195. Volunteers may also be protected by immunity provisions found in state emergency response
statutes, discussed infra section III.D.
196. For a list and summary of Good Samaritan statutes, see ESAR-VHP, supra note 45, at app. D.
197. Id. at 46.
198. For statutes that cover paid emergency care providers see, for example, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-500.02 (2006); IOWA CODE § 147A.10 (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2891 (2002).
199. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (2000). Georgia also has several other Good Samaritan provisions
that offer immunity to volunteers who provide assistance during a declared emergency; to health care
providers who volunteer their services at the request of a hospital, public school, nonprofit organization,
or state agency; to those using automated external defibrillators; and to those offering care without
compensation in a free clinic. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-1-29.1 to 29.4 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
200. See generally ESAR-VHP, supra note 45, at app. D.
2008] 1943RESPONDERS’ RESPONSIBILITY
2. Volunteer Protection Acts
The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, a federal law, extends immunity to
volunteers for nonprofit organizations and governmental entities and is not
dependent upon the declaration of an emergency.201 To enjoy the statute’s
protection, a volunteer must meet the following conditions: (1) she must act
within the scope of her responsibilities; (2) where appropriate, she must be
properly licensed, certified, or authorized by the authorities within the state in
which the harm occurred; (3) she must not cause harm through willful, reckless,
or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, or a “conscious, flagrant indifference
to the rights or safety” of the harmed individual; and (4) she must not have
caused the harm by operating a mechanism of transportation for which the state
requires an operator’s license or insurance.202 The Act protects volunteers from
economic damages and limits their liability for noneconomic damages.203 The
law also carves out an exception that allows nonprofit organizations and govern-
mental entities to file suit against volunteers who work for them.204 States may
opt out of the federal Volunteer Protection Act,205 though thus far only New
Hampshire has done so.206
The statute defines “volunteer” to mean an individual who does not receive
compensation other than reimbursement for costs.207 The Federal Volunteer
Protection Act, therefore, provides significant protection for volunteers respond-
ing to a public health emergency, though some volunteers will be excluded by
the limitations described above, and entities employing or supervising them are
not covered.208
All fifty states have adopted their own volunteer protection statutes that
201. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a) (2000). The law defines “nonprofit organization” as follows:
(A) any organization which is described in section 501(c)(3) of [the Internal Revenue Code]
and [is] exempt from tax under section 501(a) of [that Code] and which does not practice any
action which constitutes a hate crime referred to in subsection (b)(1) of the first section of the
Hate Crime Statistics Act (28 U.S.C. 534 note); or
(B) any not-for-profit organization which is organized and conducted for public benefit and
operated primarily for charitable, civic, educational, religious, welfare, or health purposes and
which does not practice any action which constitutes a hate crime referred to in subsection
(b)(1) of the first section of the Hate Crime Statistics Act (28 U.S.C. 534 note).
Id. § 14505(4).
202. Id. § 14503(a).
203. Id. § 14504.
204. Id. § 14503(b).
205. Id. § 14502(b).
206. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292 References and Annotations (2006); see Steven D. Gravely & Erin
S. Whaley, A Patchwork of Protection: Sources of Volunteer Immunity for Medical & Public Health
Volunteers, HEALTH LAW. WKLY., Apr. 8, 2005, available at http://www.troutmansanders.com/mc/art-
gravely-whaley.pdf.
207. 42 U.S.C. § 14505(6).
208. Id. It should also be noted that state laws concerning volunteer immunity that are inconsistent
with federal law are preempted by the federal statute unless they offer even greater protection to
volunteers than does the federal law. Id. § 14502(a).
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provide varying degrees of liability protection.209 The Virginia State Govern-
ment Volunteers Act, for example, extends immunity only to volunteers in state
service.210 Maryland’s statute provides immunity only beyond the limits of the
volunteer’s personal insurance and excludes health care providers and employ-
ees of charitable organizations from its definition of “volunteer.”211 Colorado’s
Volunteer Service Act applies to particular categories of health care providers
who volunteer for nonprofit organizations, nonprofit corporations, government
entities, and hospitals so long as they are covered by the Federal Volunteer
Protection Act.212
C. IMMUNITY FOR PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS
Private sector actors benefit from a very limited range of immunity protec-
tions in specific circumstances. The relevant laws will be discussed in this
section.213
1. The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act
The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act)214 ad-
dresses immunity from liability relating to the administration and use of “cov-
ered countermeasure[s],” which are defined as certain pandemic or epidemic
products, security countermeasures, or drugs, devices and biological products
authorized for emergency use.215 Immunity is available to manufacturers, distribu-
tors, program planners, and their officials, agents, or employees, as well as to
those qualified to prescribe, administer, or dispense countermeasures.216 Liabil-
ity protection is triggered by the HHS Secretary’s declaring under the PREP Act
that a public health emergency exists or is likely to exist and recommending the
production, testing, distribution, or use of a covered countermeasure.217 Individu-
als who suffer death or serious injury because of a covered person’s willful
misconduct are, however, allowed a federal cause of action to which immunity
does not apply.218 In addition, the Act provides for the establishment of an
emergency fund designed to compensate aggrieved individuals for covered
209. ESAR-VHP, supra note 45, at 44.
210. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3602 (2005).
211. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-407(a)(11), (c) (LexisNexis 2006).
212. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-115.5(3)(c)(I), (4)(a) (2006). For other examples of state volunteer
protection acts, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.200 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 32
(West 2008).
213. Private sector actors may also be protected from liability under state law. See infra section
III.D.
214. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6d (West Supp. 2007).
215. Id. § 247d-6d(i)(1).
216. See id. § 247d-6d(i)(2).
217. Id. § 247d-6d(b)(1). This declaration is different from a declaration of a public health
emergency under the Public Health Service Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). For
further discussion of public health emergency declarations, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
218. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6d(d) (West Supp. 2007).
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injuries associated with countermeasures.219 The first PREP Act declaration was
issued on January 26, 2007 for the H5N1 vaccine to protect against the avian
influenza virus.220
2. The Project BioShield Act
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, as amended by the Project BioShield
Act of 2004,221 provides that during a declared emergency, the HHS Secretary
may authorize the emergency use of a product that is not yet “approved,
licensed, or cleared for commercial distribution.”222 Thus, in 2005, pursuant to
this provision, the FDA issued an Emergency Use Authorization for use of the
anthrax vaccine Adsorbed to prevent inhalation anthrax in individuals deemed
by the Department of Defense to be at heightened risk of exposure.223 In future
emergencies, responders may likewise be able to administer unapproved medi-
cal products under a similar authorization.
D. PROTECTION ARISING FROM STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE STATUTES
The states whose laws specifically address public health emergencies formu-
late liability protections in different ways.224 In very general terms, the statutes
can be categorized either as providing liability protection to parties acting
pursuant to governmental or legal authority or as providing immunity in a much
broader set of circumstances. In addition, some states do not have statutes that
specifically address public health emergencies but have laws that govern emer-
gencies in general, many of which also offer responders certain liability protec-
219. Id. § 247d-6e(a). See generally Lawrence O. Gostin, Medical Countermeasures for Pandemic
Influenza: Ethics and the Law, 295 JAMA 554, 555 (2006) (discussing laws related to medical
countermeasures and the national Vaccine Injury Compensation Program).
220. Pandemic Countermeasures; Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Prepared-
ness Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 4710, 4710–11 (Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. Feb. 1, 2007).
221. Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 247d-6a (West Supp.
2007)).
222. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
223. Authorization of Emergency Use of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed for Prevention of Inhalation
Anthrax by Individuals at Heightened Risk of Exposure Due to Attack with Anthrax, 70 Fed. Reg. 5452
(Food and Drug Admin. Feb. 2, 2005).
224. MSEHPA contains a model liability section that provides for both state and private immunity.
The state immunity provision establishes that states, political subdivisions, and state or local officials
are not liable for death, injury, or property damage resulting from activities undertaken pursuant to the
Act during a public health emergency. Gross negligence and willful misconduct, however, are not
protected. The private liability provision mandates that the following shall enjoy immunity from civil
liability for negligently causing death, injury, or property damage: 1) any person who owns or controls
property and permits its use during a public health emergency for purposes of sheltering people; 2) any
person, firm, or corporation (or agent or employee thereof) that performs a contract with and under the
direction of the state or a local government pursuant to the Act; and 3) any person, firm, or corporation
(or agent or employee thereof) that provides assistance or advice at the request of the state or a local
government pursuant to the Act. Gross negligence and willful misconduct are excluded, as are parties
whose acts or omissions caused or partially caused the public health emergency. See MODEL STATE
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT §§ 804(b)(3)–(4) (Ctr. for Law & the Public’s Health, Discussion Draft
2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf.
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tions.225 The following are several examples of the various immunity models.
1. Immunity Tied to Compliance with Government Instructions, Government
Contracts, or Requirements of Law During Public Health Emergencies
a. Arizona. Persons or health care providers engaging in activities required by
the law, such as reporting or quarantine procedures, are immune from civil or
criminal liability so long as they acted in good faith.226 Individuals are pre-
sumed to act in good faith when their actions are required by the law.227
b. Delaware. The law deems the following to be public employees and
thereby eligible for immunity: (1) a person who owns or controls real estate and
allows its use, without remuneration, to shelter people during a public health
emergency; (2) a private person, firm, or corporation (or employee or agent
thereof) that provides assistance or advice at the request of the state or a local
government during a public health emergency.228
c. Hawaii. The state’s Director of Health is statutorily empowered to contract
with health care entities and providers for purposes of controlling a dangerous
disease epidemic that requires facilities, materials, or personnel in excess of
those available.229 Absent willful misconduct, health care providers and facili-
ties acting pursuant to such an agreement are not liable for injuries or property
damage resulting from their actions.230
d. New Jersey. Public entities and their agents, employees, or representatives,
including volunteers, are granted civil immunity for injuries caused in connec-
tion with a public health emergency or preparation for such an emergency.231
The same is true for persons or private entities that own or control property that
is used in response to a public health emergency, perform a contract with a
public entity, or provide a public entity with assistance or advice during a public
health emergency.232 Although no individual or private entity is liable for
injuries caused by an act or omission authorized by law in the context of a
public health emergency, immunity is not available for conduct that is not
authorized by the act or that constitutes a crime, fraud, actual malice, gross
225. See Tarik Abdel-Monem & Denise Bulling, Liability of Professional and Volunteer Mental
Health Practitioners in the Wake of Disasters: A Framework for Further Considerations, 23 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 573, 578 (2005) (stating that “[i]mmunity typically extends to both state agents and volunteer
responders working within the scope of their duties and in furtherance of disaster response for actions
resulting in property damage or personal injury including death, with the exception of acts or omissions
that constitute gross negligence or willful misconduct”).
226. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-790(B) (2003).
227. Id.
228. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3144 (2004).
229. HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-20(a) (2005).
230. Id. § 325-20(e).
231. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:13-19(b)(1) (West 2007).
232. Id. § 26:13-19(c)(1).
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negligence, or willful misconduct.233
e. Wisconsin. Persons who provide “equipment, materials, facilities, labor, or
services” are not liable for death, injury, or property damage so long as they
acted under the direction of governmental authorities and in response to enemy
action, natural or manmade disasters, or an emergency declared by the state or
federal government.234 No immunity is available for “reckless, wanton, or
intentional misconduct.”235
f. Wyoming. Health care providers and other individuals who follow the
instructions of a state health officer during a public health emergency will not
be liable for any activities relating to compliance with those instructions, so
long as they do not constitute “gross negligence or willful or wanton miscon-
duct.”236
2. Broader Immunity Provisions in Public Health Emergency Statutes
a. Louisiana. The law’s liability section mirrors MSEHPA, but it adds another
notable provision: “During a state of public health emergency, any health care
providers shall not be civilly liable for causing the death of, or, injury to, any
person or damage to any property except in the event of gross negligence or
willful misconduct.”237
b. Maine. The statute offers immunity from civil liability to private institu-
tions and their employees and agents to the extent immunity is available to state
agencies and employees for acts relating to reporting, confining individuals, and
providing prescribed care during a declared extreme public health emer-
gency.238 During such an emergency, private institutions are also immune from
liability that is related to properly investigating the credentials of licensed health
care workers prior to hiring, credentialing, or privileging, so long as the hiring
process complied with requirements specified in the statute.239 Finally, immu-
nity is available for participation in good faith reporting or investigative activi-
ties prescribed by the law that relate to communicable diseases.240
233. Id. § 26:13-19(c)(2).
234. WIS. STAT. § 166.03(10)(a) (2006).
235. Id. § 166.03(10)(2)(b).
236. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-114 (2007).
237. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:771(B)(2)(c) (2007). A “health care provider” is defined as a “a clinic,
person, corporation, facility, or institution which provides health care or professional services by a
physician, dentist, registered or licensed practical nurse, pharmacist, optometrist, podiatrist, chiroprac-
tor, physical therapist, psychologist, or psychiatrist, and any officer, employee, or agent thereof acting
in the course and scope of his service or employment.” Id. § 29:762(4) (2007).
238. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 816(1) (2004). An “extreme public health emergency” is defined
as “the occurrence or imminent threat of widespread exposure to a highly infectious or toxic agent that
poses an imminent threat of substantial harm to the population of the State.” Id. § 801(4-A).
239. Id. § 816 (1-A) (Supp. 2007).
240. Id. § 816(2) (2004).
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3. Provisions in General Emergency Statutes
a. California. The statute provides immunity for the state, its political subdivi-
sions, employees, and volunteers, and other states or their officers or employees
rendering aid in California.241 In addition, the law establishes liability protec-
tion for physicians and surgeons (including those licensed in a different state),
hospitals, pharmacists, nurses, or dentists who render services during a state of
emergency with the exception of willful acts or omissions.242
b. Michigan. The law provides that disaster relief force personnel who are not
employees of the state or local government are entitled to the same immunity
that is available to state employees.243 State and local governmental agencies
and their employees or agents are not liable for personal injury or property
damage sustained by disaster-relief-force personnel or any other person.244
Immunity is also extended to all those engaged in disaster relief work, including
private persons and volunteers and those gratuitously allowing use of their
premises for purposes of sheltering people, so long as they disclose any known
safety hazards on the property.245 Finally, licensed hospitals, physicians, and
certain listed clinicians who provide services during a declared emergency at
“the express or implied request of a state official or agency or county or local
coordinator or executive body” are not liable for injuries unless they result from
willful or gross negligence.246 The caregivers need not be licensed in Michigan
to be covered.247 Notably, they may also perform a variety of procedures for
which they are not licensed so long as they do so under the supervision of a
medical staff member of a licensed Michigan hospital.248
c. Minnesota. The statute establishes that while an emergency executive order
is in effect, “a responder in any impacted region acting consistent with emer-
gency plans is not liable for any civil damages or administrative sanctions as a
241. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8655, 8657(a)–(b) (West 2005).
242. Id. § 8659.
243. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.411(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). Disaster relief forces are
defined as “all agencies of state, county, and municipal government, private and volunteer personnel,
public officers and employees, and all other persons or groups of persons having duties or responsibili-
ties under this act or pursuant to a lawful order or directive authorized by this act.” Id. § 30.402(f)
(West 2004).
244. Id. § 30.411(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
245. Id. §§ 30.41(3), (7)–(8).
246. Id. § 30.411(4).
247. Id.
248. Id. § 30.411(5). The clinicians covered by subsections 4 and 5 are registered nurses, practical
nurses, nursing students acting under the supervision of a licensed nurse, dentists, veterinarians,
pharmacists, pharmacist interns supervised by licensed pharmacists, paramedics, and medical residents
being trained in a licensed hospital. Id. § 30.411(6). These individuals may perform “administration of
anesthetics, minor surgery, intravenous, subcutaneous, or intramuscular procedure; or oral and topical
medication; or a combination of these under the supervision of a member of the medical staff of a
licensed hospital of this state, and may assist the staff member in other medical and surgical
proceedings.” Id. § 30.411(5).
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result of good faith acts or omissions . . . in rendering emergency care, advice,
or assistance.”249 Coverage does not extend to malfeasance in office or willful
or wanton misconduct.250
IV. THE BOTTOM LINE: WHO AND WHAT IS ELIGIBLE FOR IMMUNITY
This Part will synthesize and analyze the contemporary immunity scheme for
public health emergency responders. American law creates a patchwork of
liability protections for various actors responding to public health emergen-
cies.251 No source, however, addresses liability and immunity issues in a
comprehensive way, and many existing statutes leave important gaps and
uncertainties.
A. GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES AND EMPLOYEES
Federal, state, and local entities and their employees or agents who are
performing their official duties enjoy extensive immunity protections. Neverthe-
less, plaintiffs may still have several litigation vehicles at their disposal.
Governmental entities and their employees are likely to be shielded from
liability for tort actions by the FTCA or equivalent state tort claims acts, as long
as the challenged act or omission relates to a discretionary function.252 With
respect to constitutional claims, federal and state governmental entities will be
entitled to sovereign immunity, but local governments are not.253 In addition,
federal and state officials will be entitled to qualified immunity for discretionary
functions unless they knew or should have known that their conduct would
violate statutory or constitutional rights.254
Under EMAC, states and their officers or employees are entitled to immunity
when they provide assistance in a different state, and clinicians need not be
licensed in the state in which they are rendering aid, so long as they are licensed
in the state in which they are employed or have been deputized.255 In addition,
states and state employees are granted liability protections under some regional
mutual aid agreements256 and state emergency response statutes, as are local
governmental entities and their employees, so long as they do not engage in
willful or reckless misconduct.257
All public employees might also enjoy the benefits of waivers of certain
249. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 12.61(2)(b) (West 2007).
250. Id.
251. See UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT 3–4 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs
on Unif. State Laws, Current Draft for Consideration Concerning Reserved Sections 11 and 12, 2007)
(on file with author) (discussing the “patchwork of protections” that may apply to specific volunteers in
limited settings).
252. See supra section III.A.1.
253. See supra section III.A.2.
254. See supra section III.A.2.
255. See supra section III.A.3.
256. See supra section III.A.3.
257. See supra section III.D.
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statutory requirements under § 1135 of the Social Security Act.258 Thus, for
example, they may not be sanctioned for violations of HIPAA or EMTALA
during a public health emergency.259 Finally, under the PREP Act, public
employees handling “covered countermeasures” will be immune from liability
for all but willful misconduct if the HHS Secretary makes a declaration that
triggers the Act.260
To illustrate, federal and state entities and officials, such as CDC employees
or state health department workers, should be immune from liability for tort
actions and constitutional claims arising from policy decisions concerning how
to triage patients or ration scarce resources so long as they act in good faith. A
public worker will not be protected against tort or constitutional claims, how-
ever, if she hordes scarce vaccines and immunizes all her friends and family
members without a public health rationale for doing so.
With respect to disclosure of private health information, public officials will
not be responsible for violations of HIPAA if a § 1135 waiver is issued.261 Even
absent a § 1135 waiver, the HIPAA Privacy Rule contains exceptions that allow
certain disclosures for the purpose of public health activities.262 However,
plaintiffs may be able to assert successful tort claims for invasion of privacy and
breach of confidentiality that are allowable under the FTCA and state law.263
Likewise, if government officials discriminate against or do not adequately
accommodate individuals with disabilities, such individuals could sue state and
local governmental entities under Title II of the ADA264 and sue federal
executive agencies under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,265 though proving
statutory violations in the context of a public health emergency might be
difficult.266
B. UNCOMPENSATED VOLUNTEERS
Individual unpaid volunteers who respond to an emergency will benefit from
258. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (Supp. IV 2004). For a discussion of this provision, see supra notes 39–44
and accompanying text.
259. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(b).
260. See supra section III.C.1.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(b).
262. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2007) (allowing disclosure of protected health information without
patient authorization to public health authorities that are “authorized by law to collect or receive . . .
information for the purpose of preventing or controlling disease, injury, or disability”).
263. See Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 564 F.2d 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that the claim
of invasion of privacy is not barred by governmental immunity); Eve Klindera, Qualified Immunity for
Cops (and Other Public Officials) with Cameras: Let Common Law Remedies Ensure Press Responsibil-
ity, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 429 n.289 (1999) (“It is unclear . . . whether the government could
successfully assert that the FTCA’s discretionary function exception should preclude liability in cases
where plaintiffs claim an invasion of privacy due to the presence of the media during official
activities.”).
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
265. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
266. See supra section II.C.
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several sources of immunity, though these too are subject to limitations. Good
Samaritan statutes enacted at the state level are one important source of this
protection.267 The Federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 also provides
limited immunity from many lawsuits to properly licensed volunteers for non-
profit organizations and governmental entities, as do some state volunteer
protection acts.268 Finally, volunteers are protected by some state laws that
specifically address general and public health emergencies.269
Although it appears that volunteers typically should not be concerned about
liability, volunteer immunity raises several complex questions. First, volunteers
are generally covered only if they are not compensated for their work.270 Thus,
an individual whose regular employer continues to pay her salary while she
participates in relief efforts in another state would not seem to be covered by
most relevant statutes. A model state law, the Uniform Emergency Volunteer
Health Practitioners Act,271 aims to address this limitation. Section 2(15) of the
model act, which would provide volunteers with liability protection, defines
“volunteer health practitioner” as “a health practitioner who provides health or
veterinary services, whether or not the practitioner receives compensation for
those services.”272 The Act, however, excludes practitioners who have a preexist-
ing employment relationship with the entity for which they are working.273
Thus, hospital employees who continue to work at the hospital during a public
health emergency would not be covered as volunteers under the Act.
Another limitation of the term “volunteer” is that it generally refers only to
individual rescuers and does not cover hospitals, businesses, and other entities
that might participate in emergency response operations without charge.274 The
Volunteer Protection Act explicitly states that it does not affect “the liability of
267. See supra section III.B.1.
268. See supra section III.B.2. Volunteers can, however, be sued by the nonprofit organization or
governmental entity for which they work. Likewise, volunteers may be responsible for certain amounts
of non-economic damages. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
269. See supra section III.D; see also, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3305/10(k) (2006); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 44.023(5) (2000 & Supp. 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 121.404, 5502.30 (West 2006).
270. See supra section III.B.1 (discussing Good Samaritan statutes); see also Volunteer Protection
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14505(6) (2000) (defining a “volunteer” as an “individual performing services for a
nonprofit organization or a governmental entity who does not receive” compensation other than
compensation for incurred expenses or any gift that is valued at over $500 per year in return for the
assistance provided); UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 2 cmt. 15 (Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2006), available at http://www.uevhpa.org/Uploads/
uevhpafinal.pdf (stating that “many legal definitions of ‘volunteer’ . . . characterize a volunteer as an
individual who does not receive compensation for services”).
271. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on
Unif. State Laws 2006), available at http://www.uevhpa.org/Uploads/uevhpafinal.pdf.
272. Id. § 2(15).
273. Id.; see also id. § 2(9) (defining “host entity”).
274. See generally ESAR-VHP, supra note 45, at app. D (summarizing state Good Samaritan
statutes). But see Corporate Good Samaritan Act of 2008, 2007 GA H.B. 89 (extending liability
protection to corporate entities providing goods or services without compensation under supervision of
state authorities, in preparation for, anticipation of, or during a declared emergency).
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any nonprofit organization or governmental entity with respect to harm caused
to any person.”275 The proposed Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practitio-
ners Act also defines a volunteer as an individual health practitioner,276 though
it would establish that “[s]ource, coordinating, and host entities are not vicari-
ously liable for the acts or omissions of volunteer health practitioners.”277 A few
initiatives have been undertaken at the state level to expand the scope of
coverage for volunteers so that it extends beyond individual persons. For
example, in May of 2008, the governor of Georgia signed into law the “Corpo-
rate Good Samaritan Act of 2008.”278 The Act extends to “any association, . . .
private for profit entity, not for profit entity, religious organization, or charitable
organization,” among other parties.279 Without such statutes, however, hospi-
tals, hotels, stadiums, and other entities that donate their time, space, supplies,
and resources to emergency response efforts, will not enjoy the benefit of laws
that establish immunity for volunteers.
C. PAID RESPONDERS AND ENTITIES
The actors who are often left entirely out of the immunity picture are private-
sector employees who are paid for their work, such as clinicians in an affected
state who continue doing their regular jobs but must operate under public health
emergency conditions. Non-governmental entities, such as private hospitals or
clinics, are also often excluded from immunity coverage, whether they charge
for their services or donate them. These exclusions are startling because health
care entities and paid workers are likely to bear the brunt of the burden during a
public health emergency, as hundreds or thousands of patients seek medical
care.
Entities and non-volunteers who manufacture, distribute, administer, or dis-
pense countermeasures or unapproved products pursuant to a declaration by the
HHS Secretary may be covered by the PREP Act or the Project BioShield
Act.280 If the Secretary issues a waiver under section 1135 of the Social
Security Act, entities and non-volunteers may also be shielded from administra-
tive sanctions for certain HIPAA and EMTALA violations, and may be excused
275. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(c) (2000).
276. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 2 cmt. 15 (Nat’l Conference of
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2006), available at http://www.uevhpa.org/Uploads/uevhpafinal.pdf.
277. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 11(d) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs
on Unif. State Laws, Current Draft for Consideration Concerning Reserved Sections 11 and 12, 2007)
(on file with author).
278. UNC Sch. of Public Health, Georgia Enacts Corporate Good Samaritan Act, May 19, 2008,
http://nciph.sph.unc.edu/law/ud_051908.htm.
279. 2007 GA H.B. 89; see also An Act Relating to Civil Emergency Preparedness; Providing
Limited Liability to a Person who Voluntarily Provides Goods or Services to Another Person for an
Emergency Situation Declared by the Governor; Repealing the Emergency Licensing Act, S. 16, 48th
Leg., 1st Sess. § 1(b) (N.M. 2007) (offering liability protection to any volunteer who is a “person,
including the person’s officers, directors, employees and agents.”)
280. See supra section III.C.
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from several other legal requirements.281 However, individuals and organiza-
tions that are not government workers will not be entitled to sovereign immu-
nity or Eleventh Amendment immunity.282 Similarly, entities and persons who
are paid for their services will not be entitled to Good Samaritan status or
Federal Volunteer Protection Act coverage.283 If responders are deputized by a
state to provide assistance for a particular emergency, they may or may not be
covered by EMAC.284 The state emergency response statutes are also inconsis-
tent in their treatment of paid responders and organizations.285
While private-sector employees and entities might enjoy immunity in some
states or in certain circumstances, their liability protection is less comprehensive
than that to which other responders are entitled. Consequently, these parties
might be sued and found liable for a variety of decisions and actions that are
likely to be required by a public health emergency. Liability could arise from
triaging decisions, choices concerning how to ration scarce resources, confiden-
tiality breaches, providing medical services without appropriate licensure, or
providing negligent care. Health care providers are well aware of these possibili-
ties and have indicated that the potential for litigation might influence their
willingness to participate in response activities.286
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Part develops a proposal for the enactment of a comprehensive immu-
nity provision that will extend to all health care providers who respond to a
public health emergency, including governmental workers, volunteers, paid
employees, and private and public entities. I attempt to fashion a balanced
approach to liability and immunity that promotes participation in emergency
response activities while safeguarding the primary goals of liability: effective
deterrence of misconduct and compensation of victims in appropriate cases.
This proposed provision is a necessary response to health care providers’
concerns about liability. In addition, it will not leave those who do respond,
perhaps at great risk to themselves, vulnerable to lawsuits for simple negligence
and thus punishable for their good-faith conduct in exigent circumstances. The
provision, therefore, could be critical to achieving effective emergency response
initiatives, providing needed guidance to decision-makers and promoting jus-
tice.
281. See supra section I.A.1.
282. See supra sections III.A.1–2.
283. See supra section III.B.
284. See supra section III.A.3.
285. See supra section III.D.
286. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
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A. MATTERS TO CONSIDER IN CRAFTING LEGISLATION
1. Encouraging Participation in Response Activities
Legislators and policymakers designing laws and regulations for public
health emergencies must be particularly sensitive to the incentives and disincen-
tives they establish through the assignment of liability and immunity. Concern
about litigation might hinder an effective response by discouraging health care
professionals or entities from offering assistance under circumstances that could
give rise to liability because they do not enable the provision of optimal care.
Some might hesitate to volunteer their services. Others who are expected to
respond in the ordinary course of their work might be so concerned about
liability that they choose to be absent from their jobs or, in the case of hospitals
and clinics, close their doors once they have reached ordinary capacity. In
addition, hospitals may refuse to accept the assistance of volunteers for fear that
they will be held liable for injuries caused by volunteers,287 even though the
uncompensated providers will themselves be immune from liability.288
Concern about liability is so profound and pervasive that, according to many,
it has led to the common practice of “defensive medicine.”289 A survey of 824
Philadelphia physicians specializing in areas with a high risk of litigation found
that ninety-three percent of respondents acknowledged that they sometimes or
often engage in at least one form of defensive medicine, including over-
ordering diagnostic tests, referring patients to other specialists unnecessarily,
and avoiding high-risk patients.290 The frequency of these activities did not
correlate with objective measures of “physicians’ liability experience and expo-
sure,” but rather, stemmed from deep anxiety, however exaggerated.291 Physi-
cians’ concern about liability is likely to be particularly acute during an
emergency, when resources are scarce and optimal care cannot be provided.292
Indeed, a survey conducted by the American Public Health Association found
that the majority of clinicians indicated that liability concerns would impact
their decisions concerning participation in emergency response efforts.293
Other analysts confirm that malpractice liability concerns lead physicians to
287. For discussion of vicarious liability and ostensible agency theories, see supra notes 71–76 and
accompanying text.
288. For discussion of immunity for uncompensated volunteers, see supra notes 267–79 and
accompanying text.
289. David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a
Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005) (discussing defensive medicine).
290. Id. at 2612, 2615.
291. Id. at 2615 (stating that “[p]ersonal anxiety may . . . overshadow actual experience”).
292. Kipnis, supra note 126, at 88 (“In a disaster, there may not be enough to go around. The
number of patients who present at a hospital can significantly exceed its carrying capacity . . . .”); Press
Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, Justice Served for Dr. Pou (July 24, 2007), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/print/17849.html (“The AMA continues to be very concerned about criminal-
izing decisions about patient care, especially those made during the chaotic aftermath of a disaster,
when medical personnel and supplies are severely compromised.”).
293. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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practice defensive medicine.294 They further find that legislative reforms that
reduce malpractice pressures diminish the use of defensive medicine and “treat-
ment intensity.”295 Consequently, according to these commentators, such re-
forms improve physician productivity, and notably, do not compromise patient
welfare and health outcomes.296
In addition, damages caps have been found to generate small increases in the
supply of physicians.297 This phenomenon is particularly relevant to public
health emergencies. It reinforces this Article’s contention that diminished con-
cerns about liability are associated with greater willingness on the part of
individuals to serve as health care providers.
The U.S. Congress, in formulating the Volunteer Protection Act, recognized
the importance of liability protection in encouraging altruistic behavior. In §
14501(a), Congress explained that:
(1) the willingness of volunteers to offer their services is deterred by the
potential for liability actions against them;
(2) as a result, many nonprofit public and private organizations and governmen-
tal entities . . . have been adversely affected by the withdrawal of volunteers
from boards of directors and service in other capacities.298
The purpose of the Act, consequently, is to promote social welfare “by reform-
ing the laws to provide certain protections from liability abuses related to
volunteers serving nonprofit organizations and governmental entities.”299
2. Controlling Court Dockets and Insurance Costs
In addition to encouraging participation in response activities, immunity can
serve important economic and efficiency functions by significantly reducing the
volume of litigation that stems from public health emergencies. Because it is
unlikely that individuals will receive the same level of care that they would
enjoy under ordinary circumstances, health care providers might be inundated
with lawsuits filed by disappointed patients absent clear alteration of liability
standards. Such litigation could significantly raise malpractice insurance costs
for health care providers. In light of substantial increases in insurance premium
294. See Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, How Liability Law Affects Medical Productivity,
21 J. HEALTH ECON. 931, 952 (2002).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Daniel P. Kessler et al., Impact of Malpractice Reforms on the Supply of Physician Services,
293 JAMA 2618, 2618, 2623–24 (2005) (“Three years after adoption, direct reforms increased
physician supply by 3.3%, controlling for fixed differences across states, population, states’ health care
market and political characteristics, and other differences in malpractice law.”); MICHELLE M. MELLO,
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPACT OF THE CRISIS AND EFFECT OF STATE TORT
REFORMS 11 (2006), http://www.rwjf.org/pr/synthesis/reports_and_briefs/pdf/no10_researchreport.pdf
(“The best studies suggest that caps are associated with a small increase in physician supply.”).
298. 42 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1), (2) (2000).
299. See id. § 14501(b) (2000).
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costs in recent years, physicians and advocates have already expressed concern
about the future of the medical profession. Some believe that many physicians
will be forced to end their careers, limit their practices to low-risk procedures,
or move away from certain geographic regions with particularly high malprac-
tice insurance rates.300 In addition, if a multitude of claims are filed that require
insurers to pay for prolonged litigation or settlements, it is possible that some
insurers will find their financial viability threatened and will stop issuing
malpractice policies.301
A large number of public-health-emergency–related cases could also clog
court dockets and prevent the judiciary from attending to other business. Such
cases might involve particularly difficult proof questions because traumatized
victims may have murky recollections of events, and chaotic conditions could
impede recordkeeping and retention of evidence. The impact of public health
emergencies on medical malpractice insurance costs and court dockets could be
reduced by the institution of liability protection about which the public is
educated so that potential plaintiffs do not pursue claims covered by immunity
legislation. Although cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct should
still be actionable, and some cases will involve disputes as to whether conduct
constituted ordinary or gross negligence, lawyers presumably would refuse to
accept clients whose complaints clearly relate to no more than ordinary negli-
gence.
3. Volunteer Oversight
An important policy question is whether volunteers should receive immunity
coverage if they are not working under the direction of a governmental entity or
nonprofit organization coordinating emergency response activities. Is it desir-
able to protect spontaneous volunteers who independently appear on the scene
and begin dispensing medication or providing treatment? Might encouraging
300. Alec Shelby Bayer, Looking Beyond the Easy Fix and Delving into the Roots of the Real
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 111, 125 (2005) (reporting that California
experienced a medical malpractice insurance crisis in the 1970s that caused doctors to leave the state or
limit their practices); Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct About Special
Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REV. 971, 975 (2005) (“Essentially, doctors and their advocates
assert that without stiff and immediate limitations on medical malpractice litigation, doctors will be
unable to afford the escalating costs of medical malpractice insurance coverage and will eventually be
‘run out of town’ or at least out of business, leaving many of us without the aid of a physician when we
need medical care.”).
301. Barme v. Wood, 689 P.2d 446, 448 (Cal. 1984) (discussing the high cost of medical malpractice
insurance coverage in California, which caused some malpractice insurers to stop selling policies and
others to raise premium charges to a level that led many doctors to leave California, limit their
practices, or practice without any insurance coverage); Hurricane Katrina Insurance Issues: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th
Cong. (2007) (statement of Rep. Bobby Jindal) (stating that insurance companies are refusing to issue
new insurance policies in Louisiana because they claim they cannot afford to do so, but noting that
insurance companies had a record $44.8 billion in profits in 2006).
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individualized interventions hinder or conflict with the efforts of relief organiza-
tions?
Existing and proposed laws adopt different approaches. Good Samaritan
statutes generally apply to all volunteers and do not distinguish between those
acting independently and those acting with oversight by the government or a
relief organization.302 State emergency response statutes are inconsistent in their
treatment of volunteers, some being more liberal than others in terms of which
volunteers are covered.303 The federal Volunteer Protection Act applies only to
volunteers of “a nonprofit organization or governmental entity.”304 The Uniform
Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act would apply only to “volunteer
health practitioners registered with a [valid] registration system . . . who provide
health or veterinary services in this state for a host entity.”305 Another proposed
statute, the Hurricane Katrina Emergency Health Workforce Act of 2005,306
similarly called for the establishment of a National Emergency Health Profession-
als Volunteer Corps “to provide for an adequate supply of health professionals
in the case of a Federal, State or local emergency.”307 Legislators drafting
statutes that address volunteer immunity and liability, therefore, must determine
whether to establish disincentives for volunteers to act independently and
whether to exclude those without oversight from coverage.
4. Professional Licensure Requirements
A further matter of concern is whether caregivers should enjoy immunity if
they provide services that require licensing that the individual does not possess.
In extreme emergencies, it may be better to have unlicensed individuals perform-
ing tasks for which they are not credentialed than to withhold care from disaster
victims altogether. Nevertheless, laxity about licensing standards can also lead
to irresponsible and unnecessarily deficient medical care. Various statutes ad-
dress this question differently. The Volunteer Protection Act, for example,
extends immunity only to those who are properly licensed or certified.308 By
contrast, Michigan’s emergency response statute allows individuals to perform
medical tasks without proper licensing so long as they are overseen by a
302. See generally ESAR-VHP, supra note 45, at app. D (summarizing state Good Samaritan
statutes).
303. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3305/10(k) (2006) (covering volunteers who work under the
direction of local emergency services and accredited disaster agencies); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 30.411(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (covering volunteer members of disaster relief forces or other
“private or volunteer personnel engaged in disaster relief activity”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 12.61(1)(c),
(2)(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (covering volunteers who provide health-related services and act in a
manner that is consistent with emergency plans).
304. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a) (2000).
305. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 3 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on
Unif. State Laws 2006), available at http://www.uevhpa.org/Uploads/uevhpafinal.pdf.
306. Hurricane Katrina Emergency Health Workforce Act of 2005, S. 1638, 109th Cong.
307. Id. § 3(a).
308. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a)(2) (2000).
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licensed hospital worker.309 Thus, precedent exists for both approaches.
B. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE IMMUNITY PROVISION
The most appropriate remedy for the existing gaps in the public health
emergency immunity scheme is a comprehensive immunity provision that
addresses liability for all health care providers, whether they be paid or unpaid,
private or public sector workers, individuals, or entities. Such a provision
should be incorporated into the Public Health Service Act310 and state public
health emergency statutes so that it applies when either the HHS Secretary or a
governor declares a public health emergency.311 States that do not currently
have a statute that specifically addresses public health emergencies would be
urged to enact such a law, incorporating a comprehensive emergency provision.
1. The Details of the Suggested Provision
The provision should establish that health care providers will not be liable for
injuries or harm caused by good-faith actions undertaken in order to respond to
a public health emergency so long as they are acting in their capacity as
employers or employees in the affected area or volunteering under the direction
of governmental authorities or nonprofit organizations, and are not engaged in
willful misconduct, gross negligence, or criminal activity.
The term “health care provider” should be defined as a “provider of services”
or a “provider of medical and other health services,” as those terms are defined
in the HIPAA legislation.312 HIPAA defines “provider of services” in relevant
part as “a hospital, critical access hospital, skilled nursing facility, comprehen-
sive outpatient rehabilitation facility, home health agency, [or] hospice pro-
gram.”313 “Medical and other health services” are defined by describing various
hospital, diagnostic, clinical, ambulance, and other services, which are too
numerous to list here.314 Thus, if hotels were turned into hospitals in an
emergency or unlicensed individuals were trained to provide certain covered
services,315 they would be considered health care providers and eligible for
protection under the proposed provision.
The law should also address oversight and licensure issues. Following prece-
dent established in the Volunteer Protection Act, volunteers should be protected
309. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.411(4), (5) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
310. 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). On February 7, 2007, Representative Paul
Gillmor in fact introduced a bill “[t]o amend the Public Health Service Act to provide liability
protections for employees and contractors of health centers under section 330 of such Act who provide
health services in emergency areas.” H.R. 870, 110th Cong. (2007). Thus, some lawmakers are already
contemplating revisions of the Public Health Service Act to include an immunity provision.
311. For discussion of emergency declarations by various authorities, see supra section I.A.
312. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(s), (u) (West Supp. 2007).
313. Id. § 1395x(u).
314. Id. § 1395x(s). The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines “health care provider” by reference to these
statutory provisions. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2007).
315. See infra notes 321–22 and accompanying text.
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only if they are working with oversight from a governmental entity or nonprofit
organization.316 Thus, volunteers will not be protected if they appear on the
scene independently and operate without direction from coordinating agencies.
Such conduct is undesirable because it could hinder and conflict with, rather
than advance, response operations.
While particular organizations might choose to call only upon volunteers who
are listed on a registry,317 the provision should cover all volunteers who are
appropriately licensed318 and supervised, regardless of whether they are mem-
bers of a registry. In an emergency, it is possible that computer and communica-
tion systems will fail, thus hindering the use of registries, or that many of those
who registered with the hopes of serving as responders will be unavailable
because of their personal circumstances. It seems imprudent to turn away
qualified volunteers because of their registry status when there is desperate need
for assistance.
Ordinarily, responders should be required to hold appropriate licenses, certifi-
cates, or permits to perform the tasks they are undertaking. The proposed
immunity provision, however, should incorporate the principle of licensure
reciprocity established in EMAC.319 Thus, during a public health emergency,
individuals licensed in one state would be able to provide assistance in another
state in which they are not licensed.320
It is possible, however, that at the height of the crisis, demand for care will be
so great that there will not be enough personnel with licenses from any state to
provide all needed services. At that point, a choice will have to be made
between foregoing care altogether and utilizing individuals with a strong medi-
cal background who are not specifically credentialed to perform the tasks at
issue. Consequently, the law should enable the HHS Secretary or a governor to
make a specific finding during a public health emergency that the supply of
licensed health care professionals is insufficient to meet demand and to issue an
order allowing health care providers to perform tasks for which they are not
licensed as long as they do so under the supervision of properly credentialed
health care providers. This determination would be separate from the determina-
tion that a public health emergency exists, and the authorization would not
require health care entities to utilize unlicensed providers. Rather, it would
empower them to choose to do so and would extend immunity for all but willful
misconduct, gross negligence, and criminal activity to the unlicensed workers,
316. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a) (2000).
317. For discussion of volunteer registries, see supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. The
Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act of 2007 would protect only individuals who are
registered with a registration system. UNIF. EMERGENCY VOLUNTEER HEALTH PRACTITIONERS ACT § 3 (Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2006), available at http://www.uevhpa.org/Uploads/
uevhpafinal.pdf. A covered registration system is defined in section 5 of the Act. Id. § 5.
318. For discussion of licensure requirements, see infra notes 319–22 and accompanying text.
319. For discussion of EMAC, see supra section III.A.3.
320. See 110 Stat. 3877, 3880; supra section III.A.3.
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their supervisors, and the health care entities using their services while operat-
ing under such authorization.
A similar approach has already been adopted by the state of Michigan.321
Michigan specifies the categories of individuals who may perform particular
services for which they are not licensed, with appropriate oversight. These
include registered nurses, practical nurses, nursing students supervised by li-
censed nurses, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists, pharmacist interns super-
vised by licensed pharmacists, paramedics, and medical residents being trained
in a licensed hospital in any state.322 The proposed statutory amendment should
similarly specify the categories of professionals and professionals-in-training
who have a sufficiently strong medical background to be eligible to perform
services under this provision. It should also specify the tasks that they should be
authorized to perform under appropriate supervision. Legislators might consider
including, in the list of eligible individuals, clinicians who became inactive or
retired in good standing and are still physically and mentally able to work.
Telemedicine may offer another resource for public health emergency re-
sponse efforts. Telemedicine is “the delivery of health care at a distance,
increasingly but not exclusively by means of the Internet.”323 According to
some, India has been extremely active in providing telemedicine to the United
States, having captured as much as two percent of the U.S. health care market
through outsourcing and earning hundreds of millions of dollars.324 While some
states have erected legislative barriers to the employment of foreign providers
for purposes of telemedicine,325 health care providers outside the United States
with experience serving American physicians and patients might be an invalu-
able resource during an emergency. States that have statutorily rejected this
approach might need to incorporate waivers of the telemedicine practice restric-
tions into their public health emergency response laws.
The proposed immunity provision is designed to create a comfort level that
will encourage entities and individuals to participate in response operations and
321. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.411(5)–(6) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
322. Id. § 30.411(6)(a). The services that can be performed by such individuals are “administration
of anesthetics; minor surgery; intravenous, subcutaneous, or intramuscular procedure; or oral and
topical medication; or a combination of these.” Id. § 30.411(5).
323. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS: COMPUTER APPLICATIONS IN HEALTH CARE AND BIOMEDICINE 991 (Ed-
ward H. Shortliffe & James J. Cimino eds., 3d ed. 2006).
324. Thomas R. McLean, The Future of Telemedicine & Its Faustian Reliance on Regulatory Trade
Barriers for Protection, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 443 (2006) (citing India Office, World Health Org.,
Country Report for Mode 1: Cross-Border Trade in Health Services 65 (July 2003) (draft working
paper, available at http://www.whoindia.org/en/section2/section233_538.htm)).
325. See IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5-1-1.1(a)(4) (West 2006) (deeming medical consultation transmit-
ted through electronic communications on a regular and non-episodic basis to constitute the practice of
medicine in Indiana and thus to require Indiana licensure); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 151.056(a) (Vernon
2004) (establishing that a “person who is physically located in another jurisdiction but who, through the
use of any medium, including an electronic medium, performs an act that is part of a patient care
service initiated in this state . . . that would affect the diagnosis or treatment of the patient, is considered
to be engaged in the practice of medicine in this state and is subject to appropriate regulation by the
board,” including licensure requirements).
2008] 1961RESPONDERS’ RESPONSIBILITY
make unavoidable, difficult decisions, such as those concerning triaging and
allocation of scarce resources, without excessive concern about litigation. Never-
theless, it requires individuals and organizations to do their best under the
circumstances and deters intentional misconduct. For this reason, a “good faith”
requirement is incorporated into the law and willful misconduct, gross negli-
gence, and criminal activity are excluded from immunity. There is, however, a
high standard of proof for establishing these categories of wrongdoing. Gross
negligence is “[a]n intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless
disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another.”326
The standard for willful misconduct is also high, requiring conscious intent to
undertake the injurious activity with a realization of the likelihood of harm.327
Criminal liability must be proved “beyond a reasonable doubt.”328
Thus, for example, if a doctor missed a hairline fracture on an x-ray at a time
when the emergency room was inundated with hundreds of patients, she would
enjoy immunity. However, a doctor who amputated a leg on the wrong patient
would most likely be found guilty of gross negligence and would not be entitled
to immunity. Similarly, a doctor who made good-faith decisions concerning
which critically ill patients would and would not receive the small number of
available respirators would be entitled to immunity even if some patients who
were not treated with a respirator died. By contrast, a health care provider who
removed a respirator from an elderly patient in order to give it to a younger
patient would not be entitled to immunity because he would essentially be
killing the older individual.
A variety of organizations, such as the American Nursing Association and the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality are developing guidelines for
appropriate treatment protocols during public health emergencies.329 Such guid-
ance may assist clinicians in providing adequate care and could be useful in
litigation for the purpose of determining whether health professionals acted
appropriately and are entitled to immunity. If standard operating procedures for
emergencies have been developed and widely disseminated to health care
professionals, it is more likely that parties that adhered to the guidelines would
be deemed entitled to immunity. Conversely, those who deviated from well-
established emergency procedures will be found to have engaged in gross
326. Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 723 A.2d 454, 462 (Md. 1988)
(internal quotations omitted); see also Karen J. Kruger, Governmental Immunity in Maryland: A
Practitioner’s Guide to Making and Defending Tort Claims, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 37, 53 (2007)
(discussing the high standard for proving gross negligence).
327. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. GLC Restaurants, Inc., No. CV 05-0618 PCT-
DGC, 2006 WL 3052224, at *7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 26, 2006) (noting that “willful misconduct” is a high
standard); Martin v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 135, 141 (D.D.C. 1983) (defining
willful misconduct restrictively and stating that it exists only if the defendant recognized the probable
harm that would result from his actions).
328. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (stating that “the reasonable-doubt standard is
indispensable” to convincing the fact-finder of a person’s guilt).
329. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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negligence or willful misconduct.
2. When and to Whom Should the Proposed Provision Apply?
The immunity provision should be triggered by a declaration of a public
health emergency and should apply only to activities that took place in response
to the emergency and during the emergency’s duration.330 The provision should
have its own termination mechanism so that the HHS Secretary and the state
governors could terminate liability protection before the termination of the
public health emergency, if appropriate. It is possible that in some circum-
stances there will be reason to maintain a state of emergency, but the workload
of health care providers will abate to the point where immunity protection is no
longer justified. Because of the significant liability implications, authorities
should be careful to terminate the immunity provision—if not the public health
emergency itself—as soon as reasonably possible. If the public health emer-
gency or the immunity provision has not been terminated, the provision should
automatically expire thirty days after the public health emergency was declared,
unless it is renewed by the Secretary or governor for a specific length of time.331
The automatic termination will ensure that health care providers do not escape
liability for extended periods of time when they are not actually working under
exigent circumstances.
Because I propose extensive immunity protections, the recommended provi-
sions should apply only in very limited circumstances that involve large-scale
health threats and require the treatment of hundreds or thousands of patients.
Emergencies such as tornadoes, earthquakes, and the Murrah Federal Building
bombing often do not rise to this level in public health terms because injuries
are suffered only in a small area and local hospitals can either process patients
effectively themselves or transfer them to hospitals outside the impacted loca-
tion. In some cases, a general emergency, such as a natural disaster, may
ultimately lead to a serious disease outbreak, but at that point, a public health
emergency should be declared. Absent such a declaration, responders would
enjoy many of the existing immunity provisions332 and would be judged based
on a standard of care that would take into account emergency conditions and
unusual patient loads,333 but the proposed comprehensive immunity provision
330. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(e)(1) (Supp. IV 2004) (providing that a waiver of legal requirements
pursuant to this section ends upon termination of the declared emergency or disaster). For further
discussion of this provision, see supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text.
331. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(e) (providing for automatic termination of the waiver after sixty days
from its initial date of publication unless it is extended for a further sixty-day period or another
additional period of time). For a detailed discussion of this provision, see supra notes 39–44 and
accompanying text. Because the proposed immunity provision will have more far-reaching implications
than the limited waiver at issue in § 1320b-5, a thirty-day duration is recommended instead of the
sixty-day duration of § 1320b-5.
332. See supra Part III.
333. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (defining standard of care in terms of what a
reasonable practitioner would do under similar circumstances).
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would not apply.334
In addition, the recommended immunity provision would apply only to health
care providers. It would, however, cover all such providers, including those that
are governmental entities or employees, volunteers, private entities, and individu-
als working for compensation in the private sector. Hospitals, clinics, and
physicians’ offices could be inundated with an extremely high volume of very
sick patients. It is unjust to exclude health care providers and other workers who
are operating under intense pressure in unprecedented circumstances from
liability protection simply because they are paid. Furthermore, such exclusion
could lead some to close their doors or refuse to work and choose to risk
termination rather than tort litigation. Although many health care providers will
have medical malpractice insurance coverage, such coverage will be of little
comfort to those who fear litigation itself, which may expose them to significant
adverse media coverage335 and threaten the viability of their practices. Litiga-
tion can also lead to higher insurance premiums, which some health care
providers would find difficult to absorb.336
While many others could be called upon to respond to a public health
emergency, health care providers require licensing and very costly malpractice
insurance, offer special skills, and routinely make life and death decisions.
Malpractice cases against health care providers are often very difficult to prove
and generate prolonged litigation involving many costly experts. These difficul-
ties would be compounded in an emergency, when treatment is given in chaotic
conditions that do not allow for thorough deliberations concerning care deci-
sions or for extensive record-keeping. Moreover, health care providers, whose
professional success depends largely upon their personal reputation and pa-
tients’ trust, have much to lose from the mere fact of being sued, even if they
ultimately prevail in court. In sum, health care providers are particularly
vulnerable to suit, and their concern about liability is acute.
Other responders, such as law enforcement officials, transportation workers,
food suppliers, and rescuers, will benefit from some of the existing immunity
provisions337 and from a lenient standard of care that is associated with exigent
circumstances,338 but they do not require the proposed comprehensive immu-
nity provisions. Truck drivers who are late in delivering medical supplies, for
334. See Anthony B. Iton, Rationing Influenza Vaccine: Legal Strategies and Considerations for
Local Health Officials, 12 J. PUB. HEALTH MANAG. & PRACT. 349, 354 (2006) (stating that “there may be
a variety of political and practical reasons why politicians might not want to declare a state of
emergency”).
335. Miguel Bustillo, Doctor Cleared in Katrina Case, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 2007, at 3 (discussing the
well-publicized case of Dr. Anna Pou, who was accused of hastening the deaths of four patients in New
Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, though the grand jury ultimately declined to indict her).
336. For a discussion of rising medical malpractice insurance costs and their impact on physicians,
see supra note 300 and accompanying text.
337. See supra Part III.
338. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (defining the “standard of care” in terms of how a
reasonable practitioner would operate under the circumstances).
1964 [Vol. 96:1913THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
example, could easily prevail in court if they could prove that the delay was
caused by road blocks or other unavoidable difficulties. State officials who are
not health care providers and who make law enforcement or resource allocation
decisions will enjoy the benefit of governmental immunity or qualified immu-
nity, and thus should also have little concern about litigation.
C. CONCERNS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED APPROACH
Because the concept of standard of care already incorporates the notion that
appropriate treatment will vary depending on the circumstances at issue, it is
arguable that no immunity provision is needed at all for public health emergen-
cies. Courts will decide negligence claims in light of the exigent circumstances
under which clinicians were operating and will not expect them to provide the
same quality of treatment that they would furnish in ordinary times. Similarly,
specialty hospitals that ordinarily handle only elective surgery or orthopedic
problems would not be judged as harshly as hospitals with trauma units whose
emergency rooms are accustomed to handling large volumes of critically ill
patients. Nevertheless, the proposed immunity provision is needed for two
reasons. First, if the public is informed about its existence, the provision will
discourage plaintiffs from bringing inappropriate suits and thereby clogging
court dockets, diverting resources that could otherwise be spent on recovery
efforts and raising malpractice insurance costs.339 Second, aggrieved individuals
could bring many claims other than negligence that do not incorporate the
standard of care concept.340 In order to provide comprehensive protection, the
proposed provision is general and broad enough to address all potential civil
causes of action, including those arising from breach of confidentiality, EMTALA,
the ADA, and others.341 It thus covers any injuries or harm caused by good faith
actions undertaken in response to a public health emergency, excluding willful
misconduct, gross negligence, or criminal activity, regardless of the theory of
liability used by plaintiffs who believe that they have been wronged.
Critics might also argue that the proposed provision undermines the dual
goals of liability: deterring misconduct and compensating injured parties. Poten-
tially, added immunity might under-deter negligent behavior by reassuring
clinicians that they will not be held liable for carelessness that falls short of
gross negligence or willful misconduct. In addition, immunity would deprive
parties injured by negligent care of compensation for the harm they have
suffered. Nevertheless, I would argue that the benefits of the proposed solution
far outweigh its costs.
First, it should be noted that commentators disagree about the effectiveness
of tort liability as a deterrent to misconduct, and the empirical literature
339. See supra section V.A.2.
340. See supra Part II.
341. See supra Part II.
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provides only weak evidence in this regard.342 Some have argued that tort law
fails to deter undesirable behavior because its sanctions are perceived as weak,
it does not clearly articulate what conduct will be punished, much of the activity
that is sanctioned cannot be changed through monetary incentives,343 and fear
of liability discourages innovation and, therefore, actually retards social
progress.344 In addition, filed malpractice cases often do not reflect actual
instances of medical malpractice.345 According to several sources, many epi-
sodes of negligence are not challenged in court, and many of the cases that are
filed are not brought against providers who had actually committed malprac-
tice.346 Critics also claim that moral principles provide a much stronger incen-
tive for appropriate behavior than does tort law.347 Furthermore, the deterrent
effect of tort law is vitiated by the availability of liability insurance.348
Some commentators, nevertheless, point to studies indicating that the tort
system influences conduct to a limited extent, reducing malpractice by some-
what less than thirty percent and negligent driving by approximately ten per-
cent.349 In the words of one commentator, “tort law, while not as effective as
economic models suggest, may still be somewhat successful in achieving its
stated deterrence goals.”350 Others have stressed the need for additional empiri-
cal research and propose ways to increase the deterrent effect of medical
342. PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE DILEMMAS OF TORT LAW 68
(1997) [hereinafter BELL & O’CONNELL] (noting that “[r]ecently, . . . scholars, ‘reformers,’ and even
some judges have expressed skepticism about whether tort awards have any significant deterrent
value”); Jerry L. Mashaw, A Comment on Causation, Law Reform, and Guerilla Warfare, 73 GEO. L.J.
1393, 1394 (1985) (stating that “it is extremely difficult to find any empirical evidence that the tort
system produces deterrence in the sense normally talked about”); Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort
Liability and Insurance on Heavy Drinking and Drinking and Driving, 38 J.L. & ECON. 49, 72 (1995)
(asserting that “[t]here is a paucity of empirical evidence on deterrent effects of tort law”).
343. This might be so because the behavior is unconscious, the threat of sanctions is too remote, or
the actors have too great an interest in continuing the conduct. See BELL & O’CONNELL, supra note 342,
at 85–87.
344. See id. at 77–78.
345. Cramm et al., supra note 7 (reporting on a study by the Harvard Medical Group that reviewed
30,195 patient records and found 306 instances of provider negligence, but of these, only three percent
were challenged in court, while eighty-three percent of the forty-seven claims filed by the relevant
patients were against providers who had not been negligent).
346. Id.; see also Paul C. Weiler, Reforming Medical Malpractice in a Radically Moderate—and
Ethical—Fashion, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 205, 214–16 (2005) (reporting that while there are 115,000
negligent medical injuries or deaths annually, only about 55,000 claims are filed each year, “of which
just 15,000 produce any payments at all (whether through settlements or jury awards)”).
347. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 382 (1994).
348. Id.
349. Id. at 444; see also PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 91 (1991) (arguing that
tort law has stimulated “broad-based improvements in the institutional environment and procedures
through which medical care is provided”).
350. Schwartz, supra note 347, at 443; see also Richard A. Posner, Alternative Compensation
Schemes and Tort Theory: Can Lawyers Solve the Problems of the Tort System?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 747,
749 (1985) (referring to studies that “show that liability insurance premiums affect the decision to drive
[and] that the number of automobile deaths has risen as a result of the no-fault movement (perhaps by
as much as 15% in some states)”).
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malpractice litigation.351
The recommended provision responds to the unique circumstances of a
public health emergency. It preserves the goals of deterrence and compensation
but modifies liability rules to fit the chaotic and unusual circumstances at issue.
While egregious behavior will be deterred by the prospect of liability, the threat
of liability will not loom so large that it deters individuals or entities from
participating in emergency response activities or punishes them for their willing-
ness to provide aid, as it will not attach to simple negligence. Likewise, victims
will be compensated for intentional wrongdoing or gross negligence, but not for
more minor oversights. It is likely, in fact, that some of those who suffer harm
because of sub-optimal care would have been even worse off absent the
negligent services because they would have received no care at all. It should
also be noted that in many circumstances, disaster victims will be able to obtain
compensation for property loss and injuries through FEMA352 or victim relief
funds, such as the one established after the events of September 11, 2001.353
Thus, even without access to the courts, individuals will not be left devoid of all
financial resources.
Public policy decisions concerning the creation of immunity provisions
would be facilitated by further empirical research regarding the behavioral
impact of the potential for liability, particularly in emergency situations. Absent
hard data, legislators must base decisions on instinct and conjecture about
human psychology. The recommended provision is designed to promote both
individual justice and general public welfare by deterring intentional miscon-
duct, compensating victims when compensation is clearly due, encouraging
widespread participation in response efforts, and, at the same time, addressing
concerns about a potential proliferation of lawsuits that could overwhelm the
courts and be extremely costly for health care providers and malpractice
insurers.354
D. OTHER APPROACHES
Commentators have made several other suggestions for addressing liability
351. See generally Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory
and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1615, 1623–28 (2002) (stating that
“further empirical study would be appropriate” and discussing suggestions for “[s]harpening the
[d]eterrent [s]ignal”).
352. See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, What Is Disaster Assistance?, http://www.fema.gov/
assistance/process/individual_assistance.shtm (“Disaster assistance is money or direct assistance to
individuals, families and businesses in an area whose property has been damaged or destroyed and
whose losses are not covered by insurance.”).
353. See generally M. ANN WOLFE, DOMESTIC SOC. POLICY DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HOMELAND
SECURITY: 9/11 VICTIM RELIEF FUNDS (2003), http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/
crsdocuments/RL31716.pdf (discussing the federal response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 and
the status of selected victim relief funds).
354. For discussion of concerns about court dockets and insurance costs in the aftermath of a public
health emergency, see supra notes 300–01 and accompanying text.
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related to public health emergencies. One option is for providers to draft
informed-consent forms that specifically apply to emergencies, thereby disclos-
ing the risks of being treated under exigent circumstances to the extent they can
be anticipated.355 It is unlikely, however, that such forms will be useful in many
circumstances. First, prior to an actual emergency, it will be difficult if not
impossible to develop forms that provide sufficient details concerning the
specific emergency rather than simply a generic list of heightened risks. Also,
many victims may come into the hospital in a condition that renders them
incompetent to give meaningful consent. Maintaining, storing, and filing the
forms might also be challenging, especially in makeshift emergency clinics
without filing cabinets and administrative assistants. Finally, patients may have
no other options for care in an emergency. As such, their signatures on emer-
gency consent forms that waive litigation rights may be deemed to have been
coerced, and the forms would therefore not insulate the hospital from liability.
A second option is the creation of compensation pools. As noted above, the
PREP Act provides for the establishment of an emergency fund designed to
compensate aggrieved individuals for covered injuries associated with counter-
measures.356 Some legal scholars have suggested the establishment of compensa-
tion pools from which payments would be made to all parties who are wrongfully
injured during emergency response activities,357 except perhaps in cases of
gross negligence or willful misconduct. Given sufficient resources, the establish-
ment of such funds could be a satisfactory solution to the liability problem.
However, in the likely event that scarce resources must be allocated among
many initiatives during a catastrophic event, the establishment of compensation
funds and claims procedures should not be deemed to be of the highest priority.
Rather, money and personnel should be focused on providing care and conduct-
ing rescue, recovery, and rebuilding operations.
CONCLUSION
A comprehensive immunity provision for health care providers that is incorpo-
rated into federal and state law would significantly improve upon the existing
piecemeal liability scheme for public health emergency responders. The pro-
posal described in this Article is designed to balance the needs of disaster
victims with the needs of those providing aid and the best interests of society at
large. The proposal aims to encourage involvement in response activities with-
out excusing egregious misconduct, to control court dockets and insurance
costs, and to address oversight of volunteers and credentialing requirements.
355. See Hodge et al., supra note 55, at 85.
356. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-6e (West Supp. 2007).
357. See Hodge et al., supra note 15, at 68 (suggesting the establishment of “a discrete compensa-
tion fund, modeled after Social Security Disability Insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, or the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, to pay claims for persons injured during emergency
responses”).
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This Article has argued that liability protection should be offered not only to
public agencies and their employees and to volunteers, but also to paid health
care workers and entities that participate in emergency operations in their
ordinary course of business. The recommended provision, therefore, is more
generous than many of those currently found in the law. Nevertheless, it does
not sacrifice the values of deterrence and justice, but rather creates incentives
and disincentives that are appropriate for the extreme and chaotic conditions of
public health emergencies. Although some who receive negligent treatment in
emergency conditions might not enjoy any recovery, they may still be better off
than they would be without any treatment at all. Moreover, those who are
injured through bad faith or intentional wrongdoing would have access to the
courts under the proposed scheme.
A clear and detailed immunity provision that addresses relevant concerns for
all health care providers participating in public health emergency response
activities, whether they be public or private parties, individuals or corporate
entities, paid or unpaid, will enhance the effectiveness of public health emer-
gency operations and remedy the existing legislative gaps.
2008] 1969RESPONDERS’ RESPONSIBILITY
